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A. Y. WSHINSKY

Speech in the Political Committee
November 24, 1951
Mr. Chairman, Messrs. Delegates:

the declaration of the "Tbree" submitted to the
General Assembly by the United States, Britain and France.
the delegations of these same countries introduced their draft
resolution on "reguhtion, limitation and balanced reduction
of alI armed form and all armaments." There is no difference
between these two documents either as regards the ,principle
underlying them or as regards the substance of the solution of the
problem raised. Both documents are designed to seme one objective and pmpse o m and the same method for attaining this ob
jective. Therefore one cannot agree with those who try to present
the draft resolution of the " T W 'as B step forward as cornpard
with the dedaration, referring to the fact that the draft resolution
conlains certain new elements and that this testifies to the rediness of the three Powers to meet the proposals of the Soviet Union
half way md reach some kind of agrment on the question under
consideration.
I sbaIl try to show how matters stand in reality in the opinion of
the Soviet delegation. In doing it I shall m a t with due attention
- ~ i n eird ~i studio everything tbat has been said here by the
supporters of the draft resoIution of the "Three" and shall be
guided solely by the interests of truth d the cause of peace which
we are defending here.
We have carefully studied the proposals contained in this draft.
We hold that it is i m p i b f e to judge these proposals properly
if you take them separately from a number of faas that chariicterize
the trend of the foreign poticy of these countries, b t and fore5
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most of the United Stares, which phys a leading role in this matter.
We are told here that the proposals mntained in the draft
resolution of the "Three" could become a turning point in his
tory, a point at which the world could turn back from the tense
situation and danger now facing every country. This was said by

Mr, Acheson here on November 19 and following him has been
repeated, Ilke an echo, by other representatives of skates, members
of the same Atlantic camp.
Such an attitude to the draft resolution of the 'Three" is devoid
of any grounds, since this draft carefuIIy avoids precisely those
important questions which require an immediate solution and
without whose sdution no real turning point in history is possible
The resolution of the "Three" circumvents the vey question of the
armaments reduction, too, by surrounding the solution of this
question with dl kinds of groundless reservations md conditions
whose objective must be clear to anyone who will carefully study
this draft.
It is );ermissibie to ask, however, of what, under these cirmrn.
stances, "turning point in history" can the authors of the xesolution
speak, especiaIly if we take into consideration that they themselver
make no secret of the fact that the measures for the reduction of
armaments and acmcd f m e s hey propose in no way exclude the
further increase of armaments and armed forces.
It was precisely these two principles, these two tasks, that Mr.
Acheson put forth in his speech of November 8, seeking to pmvc
that there was no contradiction whatever here since these, said he,
were two sides of the same coin. One task, Mr.Acheson asserted
is to increase one's military might. This is one side of the coin.
The other task is 'to work for peace. This is the other side of the
coin. Here is a new two-faced Janus: one side of his face shows
peace, the other
war.
Such a double-dealing poky, however, caanot serve and has
never sewed the cause of peace, the interests of peace-loving
countries and nations.
Mr. Acheson also said that the resolution of the "Three"
opened the way for the solution of some of the greatest questions
which are the object of discord between the East and West.

-
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As for the Soviet-Union,I must remind you that on October 5
of this yeai the Soviet Government declared to the Government
of the United States, in connection with the oral statement of the
United States Ambsssador to the USSR Mr. Kirk, that adhering
to its p e f d policy and unswerving in its deire to establish cooperation with all countries that are ready to cooperate with the
Swiet Union, our Government is wiUing to examine (rill the important and unsettled issues with the participation of the Govemment of the United States and to discuss measures for improving
internatiooaI relations, induding the relations between th Sovic:
Union and the United States.
Thus, we have stated our readiness to exexamine "dl the impat-

and unsettled issues."
Mr.Acheson said that the proposal of

tant

the "Three" could open
the path for settling "some of the greulest yrjr~tion~."We say:
"all," w e are told: "some." W e say: "settle aII the questions,"
we-are told: "let us settle some of the greatest questions." This,
of course, is a detad, but this is P characteristic detail, though
there is no need to dwell on it especially.
To caIm those who might be sincereIy alarmed and grimed at
the prospect of a further armaments drive and preparation for
war, cwered up by tallcs a b u t a reduction of armaments, about
"work for peace" and other such h e words, Mr.Acheson found
nothing better to state than tbat "there is no way of escaping this
requirement."
We cannot agree with such a stand. The peoples of the wodd
must not be regarded as daamed, as aIready condemned by a
merciless fate, by some kind of destiny, eternally to bear the heavy
burden of armaments and pay with their blood for the reckless
policy of unleashing new wars.
If one is to accept Mr.Acheson's thesis that further armament
is inevitable - and this is the main thesis of the entire foreign
policy and diplomacy of the United States of America and certain
states wbich support this policy -then one cannot seriously raise
the question of a reduction of armaments and armed forces.
To introduce proposals for the reduction of armaments and
am-& forces and at the same time develop feverish activity to
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increase one's armaments and armed form, ktrengthar the existing agg~essivemilitary blocs and knock together new aggrasive
military HOG,
like the so-called "AIlied Command in the Middle
~ & t" to do this

means to try to cover up one's aggressive aim
aad plans with talk about reducing armaments and striving for
peace.
Is it not: clear that this "AlIid Command in the Middle East"
is aimed at drawing the states of the Near and MiddIe Eastern
area into the war prt$amtions of the aggressive Atlantic bloc under
cover of the alleged "defense" of this acea?
Under the pretext of "aid" to Egypt and to the other cwntrie
of this area, &e four Powers, beaded by the United States, are
foisting heir troops on these countries and are seeking to have
military bases, ports, instahtiom, amed forces and commamications placed at the disposaI of this command.
The organization of such a command is Jinked with extensive
plans for setting up new and expanding the existing military bases
in Egypt, Iraq and other countries of the Near and Middie East,
psolonging the presence of foreign armed forces and bringing additional foreign armed forces to their territories, contrary to the
dearly expressed will of their population.
Our note pertaining to this question painted out that, if realized, this entire plan for setting up a soaUed Middh Eastern
C o m m d must inevitably lead to the actual military oxupation of
tbe countries of the Near and Middle East by tmops of the United
States, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, which are located 12,000to rr,ooo kilometers away from this area, as well as
by troops of certain other camtries members of the Atlantic
alliance. The establishment sf foreign military bases, in tbr fitst
place American, on the terrihries of the Middle and Near Eastern
stam stiH more emphasizes the aggressive nature of this undertaking, References to the interests of the d e b of the Near and
Middie East covet up the involvement of these counuk in the
mititary measures of the Atlaatic bloc, which are d i r d against
tbe Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. It is known, however, that the Soviet Union is firm in its polrcy of peace and is the
initiator and ardent champion of such important measures as the
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prbhibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control over this prohibition, as the reduction of am&
forces of the h e Great ~ 6 w e t sby one-third, cessation of the aggressive war in Korea and conclusion of a Pact of Peace.
As for the countries of the East, including the Near and
Middle East, it is generally known that sympathy for the
national aspirations of the peoples of the East and for tbe
struggle they wage to obtain national independence and MVereignty defines the policy of the Soviet Union toward these
countries. AIso known to all is the support which the Soviet
Union has invariably rendered to these countries in the satisfaction of their lawful national demands. 1 ha11 remind you
that it was precisely the Soviet Union which in 1946 supported
in the Security Couad the lawful demands of Syria and
Lebanon for the evacuation of foreign troops from their
territories; it was the Soviet Union that in 1947 in the Security
Council supported the similar demands of Egypt.
All these facts speak far themselves and require w comThese facts d e it dear what a difference there is in principle
between the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, a peace policy, and
the policy of the imperialist states, which pursue aggressive
ends. This policy dso dekrmines the stand of these Powers in
considering such questions as the reduction of amarnenrs
md amed forces. N o matter what honeyed speeches the rep
rffentatives of these countries may make in the effort to
lend a different appeatance to this policy, the truth will out, as
the saying goes.
Each day offers more new facts revealing the real nature
of the foreign poiicy of the Athatic bloc states, and first and
foremost of the United States, whose ding circles are obsessed
by the maniacal idea of world domination. The more ruthkss
the facts exposing this poky become, the more urgent
becomes the need to cover up, camouflage the aggressive
nature of this policy, to style themselves as friends of peace
and internationa1 cooperation. But how is this styling to be
tallied with everything that is being done by the organizers

and 1eadcrs.of the Atlantic bloc? They even go on to d e g c
that the war, imposed by American interventionists on the
Korean people, is being waged to defend the United States;
that the war against the Vietnamese people is being waged
to defend France, and that the British troops in Egypt are also
acting out of p&ceful considerations.
It is not accidental that the other day the Egyptian deIegate
stressed in this committee that the speech Mr. Eden had made
at the Assembly, professing the peace-loving aspirations of
British foreign policy, was hardly mmpatibie with the present behavior of the British troops in the S u a Canal Zone.
This was also confirmed by the Prime Minister of ~ g ~ p t
Nahas Pasha who, it seems, yesterday again drew attention to
the excesses, marauding and a11 kinds of outrages perpetrated
by the British troops in the Suez Canal Zone they had occupied.
The events in the Far, Near and Middle East fully dispel
the legend about the peacefuI aims and peaceful nature of the
foreign p i i c y of the Atlantic bloc.
The aggressive policy of the United States, which calls the
tune in the Atlantic bloc, is an embodiment of the principles
underlying the very foundation of this policy. It is known that the
most important of these principles is the so-called establishment of
"situations of strength," according to the favorite expression
of Mr. Truman and Mr. Achesoa, a principle signifying the
worship of armed force, upon which the United States Ieaders
place all hopes.
Why, it was precisely Mr. Truman who said that the
possibility of ensuring peace will be greater if the United
States unswervingly realizes its military program. W h e n asked
whether this statement couId be interpreted in the sense that
the United States would sooner rely on strength than on
agreement with the Soviet Union, Mr.Truman repiid in the
affirmative, adding that this was necessary under the present
circumstances.
Still earlier, in his message to Congress in January this year,
Mr. Truman said that creation of United States military might
was "the only realistic road to peace."

-

Formulating the principles and aims of United States foreign
policy, tbe USA Secretory of State on his part stressed the
importance of increasing the American armed forces, pointing
out that the armed foms of tbe United Sbtates were expanding, that new types of weapons were being forged and
that simultaneously the &es of the United States, (i.s., the
very same membek of the Atlantic blw), were increasing their
war production and re-establishing their armed forces.
In a speech in Detroit on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of that city, Acheson energetically praised the successes achieved in organizing the armed forces of the Atlantic
bloc, mentioning such, as he said, positive facts as the formation of new divisions. maneuvers of tactical air force.- expansion of the chain of American tactical air bases in Europe and
development of war production in Western Europe. In a word,
Mr. Acheson spoke like s real war minister or like a commander in chief of an army getting ready for a campaign. He
praised the "Schuman plan" as "bold and very promising,"
although it is generally known that this plan for merging the
coal and metallurgicaI industries of Western Europe on the
basis of the Ruhr, this age-old seat of Prussian militarism
and Hitlerite aggression, s; directed at increasing the war
wtential of the-kt~anticbloc and remesents a direct threat
;o the security of Western ~ e r m a n q sneighbors, includinp:
France, to the security of dl of Europe and consequently to
the general security of all peoples.
Mr. Acheson frankly spoke of the efforts of the United
States to build up "situations of strength" in Asia, the Middle
East and other countries of the world, humoring himself and
others that these "situatims of strength" would force the Soviet
Union to yield to the aggressive demands and claims of the
United st&. One should wonder how imprudent and shortsighted the USA Secretary of State is in supposing that the
Soviet Union could be made to do anytbing by force and in
not understanding that this is altogether unsuitable I=gwge with regard to the Soviet Union.
I n February f 950, at a reception in the White House arranged
A

by the Advertising Guncil, Mr. Acheson said that the only way to
do business with the Soviet Union was to create a situation h
which strength would be redconed with.
TQmislead the American people and the peoples of other countries participating in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, lies and slanderous inventions are circulawd about tbe Soviet Union, which is
allegedly threatening to attad tbe United States ar some other

-

country.

The hurdity and falsity of such statements have already been
expased more than once by the Soviet Union.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
J. V. Stalin pointed out in the interview given to a Prmdu carrespmdent in February this year that the Soviet Union, like any state
in the world in general, cannot develop its civilian industry to the
fdl, undertake huge construction works like the hydroelectric
stations on the Volga. Dnieper and the Amu Darya which require
tens of billions in budgehry outlays, continue a policy of systematicaIly reducing prices of artides of mass consumption, wbich
likewise requires tens of billions in budgetary outlays, and invest
hundreds of billions in the rehabilitation of the national economy
&bred by the &man invaders, and at the same time, simultaneously with this, enlarge its armed forces and expand its war
industry. J. V. Stalin poiated out that "so reckless a p&cy would
have led any state into b k m p t q . " And today, right here in the
capital of France, we ourse1ves feel the fulI justice d this remarkable prediction.
Today we already have numerous facts fully confirming this
statement of J. V. Stalk. The economic and financial position of
Great Britain, France and a number of other countries, which is
the result of the subordination of these countries to the aggressive
policy of the United States, has deteriorated to such an extent that
this can no Ionger be concealed.
The other day the newspaper Le 1Monde wrote:
"Europe is now living through the most setious crisis since liberation. Its denouement is near. It may be very dangerous for
France and for the cause of peace. But this danger can still be
12

averted if those who play s part in this matter agree to overcome
their prejudice. It is a dual uisis: economic snd political.
"Until now there was talk ody of its fiist aspect, which after
the alarming speeches of Butler and R. Mayet disturbed Mr. Acheson as well
The British journal Trib~ne,s p d i g of "aid" which Britain
bas to receive from America, said that t b i aid would be given
and added that it would lx given, but "not with the aim of making our economy viable but for the precise and declared putpose
of enabling us to carry r rearmament burden which would otherwise break our backs . ."
France is groaning under the weight of economic diffidties
caused by so-called rearmament, i.e, expansion of the arrned
forces of France . Great Britain fean that the burdm of rearmamat might break her back.
As for the situation in the underdeveloped countries, it is characterized by the following faas: they have become poorer in the
p a ~ .lo
t years; they have less foad t h they had 10 years ago ;
hey have no internal resources to cover the shortage of capital
since, in addition to everything else, they do not fully control
their natural wealth and since a substantial and disproportionate
part of the income derived from this wealth is exported. In other
words, these countries are being robbed by the foreign monopolists. An insigndcant part of the annual p d t s derived from the
present capital investments
only one per cent of what the Atlantic cammonwedth, i.e., tbe Atlantic bloc, spends on its mannament program - is set aside for accomplishing the tremendous
task connected with developing the underdeveloped countries.
Tbis is almost a word for word outline of what was said by the
President of the United Nations Economic and Sacial Council, the
Chilean delegate Sanh Guz who can dso in no way be suspected of a dispsitim to paint a gloomy picture of the situation
in the capitalist countries or to engage in propaganda exposing
the pernicious influence of the United Stares foreign policy on the
mode position of the countries of the capitalist world. (I must
however explain &at the words: "in other words, these countries
are being robbed by the foreign rnonopolisb" do not belag to

. . ."

.
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Santa C m but to me. AU the rest outlines the content of his
speech almost t d y . )
Such are the results of the present foreign political course
of the United States, which has already made itself definitely
feIt in such countries as Great Britain, France, Belgium and
a number of other countries, including so-called little- or underdweIoped countries. Yet the United States continues to pursue
its line, counting on its ddhrs, on their aIIeged magic power.
As we have dready been able to learn from the statements
of authoritative American spokesmen, the United States
continues to steer a murse of foreign policy associated with
the frenzied armaments drive and precluding any serious
measures for an armaments reduction. Here the id& fixe, this
positive obsession of the leaders of the United States that they
must preserve for the United States the military superiority
of which they love to taIk so much, especially in the fields of
aviation and atomic weapons, continues to dominate. It was
of this that Mr. Acheson spoke at a joint meeting of the
Senate Foreign ReIations and Armed Services Committees
in February this year. He argued that the best method for
utilizing the United States advantage in aviation was "to
move ahead under this protective shield to build the balanced
collective farces in Western Europe," to cantinue along this path
even after, as Mr. Acheson put it, the superioiitg of the
United States in atomic weapons lessens. In anticipation
of the inevitable advent of such time, leading statesmen of
the United States declare that they will continue to adhere at
all levels of state power to the present course of action, the
object of which is the further expansion and establishment
of new armed forces and armaments. This, Mr. Acheson said,
is the greatest contribution to peace. I should Iike to invite
the Measrs. delegates to ponder seriously on the meaning of
this and to compare aU these statements, extolling the c d t of
force and the need for further expanding their armed forces,
further strengthening military bases, organizing new bases,
consolidating the existing bases, further developing atomic
weapons, with this pIan of so-called reduction of armaments
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which is depicted here as a turning point in wodd history.
Then perhaps it will become clearer whether it is in pIace to
say that a hand is being extended to us, or whether it is more
to the point to say that a hand brandishing arms is being
extended to us.
This is how matters stand in reality.
W e considered it necessary to review all these facts, not
out of a predilection for polemics, but because it is necessary
to put aU things in their proper places, it is necessary to call
each thing by its reaI name, because it is necessary to review
deeds in order to appraise the true meaning of words. Without
this condition no serious and fruitful discussion of important
problems is possible.
The real aims of the foreign policy of the United States
can, however, be judged not only by what American dipbmats
say but also by what they do not say and by what the American
manoplists themselves reveal. In this respect two verp recent
facts are noteworthy. One is the 38th w u a I convention of
the so-called National Foreign Trade Council held in the
United States at the end of October this year with the participation of representatives of the Morgan monopolies--the
United States Steel Corporation and General Electric; the
Rockefeller mono$lies-Standard Oil of New Jersey and Chase
National Bank; the Du Pant General Motors Corporation;
and so on.
It is sufficient to name these so-called corporations, monopolies of Morgan, Rockefeller, and Du Pont for it to become
clear that we are dealing here with an important force which
controh the destiny of the United States and wants to control
the destiny of the entire world.
The declaration adopted by the convention states that the
United States foreign economic poIicy should be "directed
aggressively toward facilitating the contribution which private
industry can make i n increasing raw material production in
foreign h d s and toward assuring the availability of these
materials in a quantity adequate to meet our growing requirements in the United States. .

. ."

Aggressively directed toward seizing the raw materials in
foreign countries t
That the American monopolists have no intention of being
fastidious about the means of seizing the raw material resources of other countries is also evident from the following
place in this declaration:
"The convention," the deciaration reads, "holds it to be
essential . . that the tremendous diplomatic, political and
economic facilities at the disposal of the United States Government
be exerted aggressively
This dilemma, which could be fatal to
the whole program of economic expansion abroad, can be resolved
o d y by forthright and aggressive action on the part of the United
States Government in the heid of its fundameold for*
economic poliq."
It is characteristic that Mr. Truman sent a message of greeting to the convention tbus stressing bis support of the program adopted by the National Foreign Trade Council. And
this is natural because it is precisely these monopolistic circles
that determine the trend of the entixe foreign policy of the
United States and the entire position in this respect of the
American Government and the State Depactment, the American Government and representatives of the American Government at this Assembly. They are speaking's language in the
interests of precisely these monopolies, of this, I shouId say,
38th convention of the so-called National Foreign Trade Council.
The second fact likewise worthy of serious attention is the
First International Conference of Manufacturers, scheduIed to
be held in New York in the beginning of December, to which
300 big industrialists of Europe, including industrialists from
Western Germany, have been invited; among them are Mam,
head of the chemical trade group in Western Germany; Fritz
Berg, president of the German Industrial Federation; h u t Hall,
president of the Norwegian Industrial Federation; and others.
The principal question to be discussed at this conference is that
of accelerating arms produbion.
And so the convention of the National Foreign Trade
Council, the conference of which I have just spoken, the
16
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conference which is opening in Rome today to which Mr.
Eden and Mr. Acheson hastened, having no more impoctant
interest than what will take pIace at this conference in Rome,
at the so-caIled Atlantic bloc council where the interests of
peace will be considered in a different aspect, in other words,
where attention will be devoted to one side of the same coin
of which Mr. Acheson spoke here. The other side of the cdn
-to work for peac-is
today left to the attention of lesser
representatives of the United States of America because Mr.
Acheson has no time to spend here on talk b u t peace. Hc
must "make peace," "work for peace" and he hurries off
to work these days together Gith Adenauer and other plotters
against peace in Rome where Mr. Eden has also hastened,
having no time to be here with us where vital and urgent
problems of peace are being discussed.
Everyone acts in accordance with his interests and the interests
of those who have sent him to do their wilI.
And now attempts are being made to persuade us &at in
this atmosphere of war psychosis and war fever, when all the
eflorts of the leading c ~ K ~ofS the United States are being
concentrated on carrying out war plans that h v e nothing in
common, and can have nothing in common, with the so-called
defense of the United States, they speak here in a *riaus vein
of some desire to reduce armaments and armed forces.
Under such circumstances, can the rep-ntatives
of th'c
three Powers offer anything more than what they offer in
their puny draft resolution on the so-called armaments reduction ?
We have seen what is the real aim, what is the real desire
of the National Foreign Trade Council, this influential
organization of the American monopoGsts, whose weight in
defming policy, including also the foreign policy of the,
United States, is welt known.

*
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has been said here that the draft resoIutim of the United

Britain and France for the reduction of armaments is
"new and bold."
States,

I
I

It is necesssry however to say outright that this draft
altogekher ignores the accumulated experience and the disappointment suffered. This plan is not new, for it is framed
in full conformity with the principles of the so-called "Baruch
plan," which principles are known to dl and have long been
rejected by a number of countries. This plan is not bold for
it does not give a single worthy solution of the problems
raised in this draft Suffice it to say that the entire pIan of
the so-called reduction of armaments and armed forces proposed in this draft is made d i r d y depeadent on a number
of preIiminay conditions, some of which are mentioned in
this draft and some of which' are not but are intensively
mentioned in the speeches made by the authors of this draft.
This for example is how matters stand with such a preliminary condition as the cessation of war in Korea. Zo the
deckration of the "Three" this condition was recorded in
item six which said directly that the general program of
reduction could not be put into operation as long as war
continued in Korea, and pointed to the necessity of simultaneously solving also the political questions dividing the
world. N o w this is not mentioned in the draft resolution.
This, however, does not mean that the authors of the resolution of the "Three"have given up this prelirniaary condition.
Indeed, if you recall Mr. Acheson's speech made in the First
Committee you will see that he continues to insist on this
preIiminary condition. In that speech of his Mr. Acheson
stated that the system of armaments reduction could not be
put into operation while the war continued in Korea and
that as long as this situation remained no plan could be
implemented.
This reference to the war in Korea is a mere pretext for
evading agreement on the reduction of armaments. If matters
stood differently how could one understand the statement
made by Acheson last June when, in answer to the question as to
whether the government would be satisfied with a sum smaller
&an that envisaged in the m u d security bill iE the situation in
K o m were settled, he replied that if there were a settlement

.
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in Korea this program would not be reduced or cut in any
respect.
What does this mean? It only means that last June we
were told that no matter whether the question of the Korean
war was settled or not, whether the wax in Korea ended or not,
this couId in no way influence the program of armaments
drawn up and approved by the American Government, by
Congress. And here we are told: we cannot agree to a re&tion of armaments before the war in Korea ends. This is
an important condition. It would be senseless to speak of
disarmament, Mr. Acheson said, when we are waging a wat
and when arms are required. Later oa, when Mr. Acheson
encountered the resistance of many delegate-pen
resistance
on the part of some, as for example on the part of the USSR
delegation, and hidden resistance on the part of others, though
the latter are still forced to vote for the American proposals
-the Ameriaan delegation resorted to a maneuver.
Haste was made to delete this point from the resolutim the
poiat about the prefiminay condition, but the same thing is being
reiterated in the
i . r , that cessation of the war in Korea is
a p r e f i condition for the duction of armaments. Here you
have the gauge of sincerity of those who extad a "Ibelaundist"
hand, i,e., the hand of which Mr. BeIaunde spoke. He has not
extended his own hand so far.
It is clearly evident from Mr. Acheson's June statement tha!
there is no coanection whatsoever between the question of the
armaments reduction and cessation of the war in Korea. Yet it is
precisely cessation of the war in Korea that is now bang put
forth as a prelirninnry condition for reducing armaments,although
this is being smuggIed through in speeches explaining'the resolution in which this point no longer Qum.
At the same time everything is being done to drag out the war
in Korea, to drag out the negotiations far cessation of hostilities.
Mr. Eden has even stated in the House of Commons that the
questidn bf war prhners k me 6f the hdis-e
tbnditi~hs
for ceasing fire ia Korea, for ceasing hostilities. But can ceasefire be made a preliminary condition for paving the way to a

m1
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p c e f u l settlement? Now the exchange of war prisoners
is a l r d y being put forth by the Anglo-American bloc as a new
additional condition for the cessation of hostilities.
This means another attempt, another pretext, another captious
abjection, another means of disrupting the negotiations in Korea
on ending the war. Now, compare all these, m e with another,
and then tell yourself how to appraise these so-calledpropids for
a reduction of armaments and these preliminary conditions, teI1
youmIf, not us, not here, not during voting, tell ywrself and tdl
your conscience . In reality, of course, thme is no connectim between these questions, and linking tbe termination of the war
ia Koxea tu the question of armaments duction is devoid of
any ground whatsoever. This is all the more so because the very
cessation of the war in Korea fully d e p d s upon the. Governm a t of the United States.
The White House merely has to give an appropriate signal and
the war in Korea will end. CoasequentIy it wilI be easy to eliiinate one of the obstacles which the American G~vmnmmtsees
in the way of reducing armaments and the armed £ o m .
The situation as regards the other preliminary conditions toa
is no better. We heard Mr. Acheson paint tq the connection bet w m the reduction of armaments and the elimination of tension

..

in international relations. He said that "if we are honest, if we are
shting what is true and if we are not making dogam or not makiag propaganda we will say that if, at the time this system of
reduction of armaments is worked out, we are in a period of highly
mounting tensions and additional frictions throughout the world,
it is highly unlikely that nations would enter into a system of
arraameats reduciion." And further: "In candor and in honesty
we must say that there is a direct relation between the ability to
put into effect a system of disarmament and the international
temperature. If the international temperature is approaching the
boiling point, few things are possible. If it has reduced so that
solutions of problems are on the way and are quite possible, then
disamament becomes a wholly different thing so far u the immediate future is concerned."
What is true is true. But is it not precisely the American Gov-
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ernment that bars mpnsibility for the fact that the political
atmosphere is becoming ever more heated, that h e political. ternperature keeps ri-?
Certainly it does, no matter how hard the
repre~ent~tives
of the United States may shun this responsibility,
no matter how h a d they may trg to wade it.
To confirm this one could cite many facts. I dready spoke about
them last time when reviewing the foreign policy of the United
States toward Korea, the People's Republic of China, Germany,
Iran, Egypt, Triate, Austria, a n d so on and so forth.
All these faas accordingly affact the temperature in intermtiond relations. As for the Soviet Union spe&caIly, with regard to
which the United States is obviously pursuing its aggressive line,
breaking international agreements with the Soviet Union and implementing measures that adanger the security of the USSR and
carry the threat of anather world war, such facts are generay
known and I have already spoken about them too. I s h d add to
what was said, but only those facts which refer directly to recent

times.
It is known that almost on the eve of this session, in the middk
of October, the President of the United States, Mr. Truman,
signed a new law known under the titk of the "Mutud Security
Act of 1951."This law envisages the special appropriation of 100
million dollars for Lancing - I am citing the respective point
from this law
"any selected persons who are residing in or
escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, A
U . . . either to form such persons into
elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization or for other purposes."
This law provides, as we see, that the United States wouId
6rance persons and armed groups on the territory of the
Soviet Union and a number of other states for carrying out

-

subversive activity and sabotage within the above states. The
law points out directly that the Government of the United
States undertakes to pay people who fled from the USSR and
other countries enumerated in this Isw or even residing in
these countries, and that it undertakes to finance uniting them
into special armed detachments. In other words, the Govern"*

ment of the United States of America undertakes to organize
and finance armed groups from among persons, both who

are residing in the USSR and who have fled from here, for
the struggle against the Soviet Union. Such actions of the
United States constitute an unprecedented intervention of the
United States in tfie internal affairs of the USSR and the
People's Democracies mentioned in this new American law.
This direct inkvention of the United States in the internal
affairs of other countries dso represents a violation of both
the generally recognized standards of international law and
the principles undtrlying the United Nations Charter. It alsu
constitutes a crass violation by the United States of tke SovietAmerican agreement of November 16, 1933 concluded by the
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR M, M.
Lihrinov and the President of the United States of America
Frmklia D.Roosevelt during the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Under that agreement, sealed by the signature of President
Roosevelt on the part of h United States, the Governments
of the USSR and the United States mutually undertook to
respect the sovereignty of both states-this is said in the
intemationaI agreement of whose sanctity certain delegates,
Mr. Eden in particular, have spoken at such length here.
The adoption of the law envisaging the apprvpriatioa of
dolhrs for subversive activity and sabotage against
the Soviet Union shows that the government of the United
S t a h of America, crassly violating the commitments it
assumed, thereby continues to pursue a p o k y of further
worsening rehiions with the Soviet Union and further agg5avating the international situation.
100 million

By promulgating its "Act of 1951" the United States Government has permitted itself to commit an unparalleled viohtiw of international standards, a violation which is incompatible with normal relations between countries and respect
for state sovereignty. Such an act cannot be regarded otherwise than as afl aggressive act designed to further complicate
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relations betweed the United States and the Soviet Union and
aggravate the internations1 situation.
The Soviet Government has lodged a resoIute protest with
the United States Government against this new aggressive
act of the Government of the United States toward the Soviet
Union and against the crass violation by the U n i d States of
cammitrnents it assumed under the agreement of November
16, 1933 and pIaced dl responsibility for such actions upon
the Government of the United States and stated that it expects
the United States Govemment to take appropriate measures for
repealing the above hw.
This unexampled, unprecedented act demands that thc
United Nations intervene in this matter. On the instructions
of my Government 1 have submitted a proposal to include on
the agenda of the General Assembly the question of this
"Act of 1951" as highly urgent and important so as to have
the General Assembly recommend to those who are still
capable of heeding its recommendations the repeal of such an
unparalleled altack on the United Nations Charter, on our
sovereign rights, on the Soviet Union.
The question arises in face of such actions of the United
States Government: How can they, without indulging in
hypocrisy and falsehood, speak of striving to relieve .the
tension in intermtiand relations? How can they present this
relieving of the tension in international relations as a preliminary
condition for adopting this resolution on the reduction of a m ments and m e d form ?
I think this is irreconcilable.
In his sp& Mr. Acheson tried to allege that the draft
resolution of the "Three" envisaged prohibition of the atomic
weapon. In reality the draft resolution contains no probibition of the atomic weapon whatever. If you examine this
draft you will easily become convinced of this. The draft
speaks of the necessity of establishing international control so
as to ensure prohibition d the atomic weapon. But this does
not at all resembIe prohibition of the atomic weapon. We have
already met such s formula before and always did the legiti23
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mate question arise: How can any international control
agency ensure prohibition of the atomic weapon if there is
no decision on prohibition of the atomic weapon?
I deem it necessary to remind you that as early as during
the First Session o£ the General Assembly in 1 9 4 a deciston
was hken obligating the Atomic Energy Commission to sub.
mit its proposals for the removal of the atomic weapon from
national armamen&. Wbat is the diffwencc h e e n this
decision taken in 1946 and the present drdt resolution proposed by the representatives of the three Powers? Actually
there is no difFerence whatever hrwcen them. Still, it is a
fact that the decision of the General Assembly of 1946 has
hot h e n fulhlled and there has been no prohibition of the
atomic weapon to this day. That i s why it is absoiutely wrong
to present the draft resolution of tbe "Three" as allegedly
providing for the prohibition of the atomic weapon.
remind you that the delegdon of the USSR bas reI must
peatedly introduced its propod for the prohibition of the atomic
weapon and the atablishmcnt of international control over the
impfernentation of this probibition. On Novunber 16 of this year
the USSR delegation iiubrnitted a props4 that .the h e r d Assembly declare the unconditiond probibition of the a r d c weapon
and the establishment of strict international control over tbe implementatim of this prohibition
There is nothing resembling this proposal in the draft m l u tion of the three Powers. Herein lies the fundamental difference,
a difference in principle between the proposal of the the Powers
and that of the Soviet Union.
However, a decision on the unconditional prohibition of the
atomic weapon nnd the establishment of strict international mntrol over the impIementatim of such prohibition by itself is still
ins&cient.
That is why the delegation of the Soviet Union proposes that
the General Assembly a h adopt another decision: "To instruct
the Atomic Ewrgy and Conventional Armaments Commission to
prepare and submit by February 1, 1952 for consideration of the
Security Council a draft convention envisaging m o r e s that en-

sure f&llment of the decisions of the G m d Assembly w the
prohibition of the atomic weapon, the discontinuation of its production, and the utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom
bombs &ady produced, and on the establishment of strict international control over the irnpIementation of the above conventiw."
We are told that it wodd be unacceptabIe to prohibit the atomic
weapon without estabhshing international control over the implementation of such prohibition became this can endanger the pition of those states which will scrupdously fulfill such a decision
on the prohibition of the atomic weapon while some other state
ventures to violate this decision. But we do propose to prohibit
the atomic weapon and to establish interaatiod control, prwiding for this either in one convention or two conventions which
should be concluded simultaneously.
But this is k i n g rejected. These, we are told, are simply
"Pm~leI,"tbat is, mere words. It turns out that to prohibit the
atomic weapon is parole^,'," while to instruct the commission
merely to study the possibility of ensuring prohibition of the
atomic weapon is a concrete deed.
AU these are fairy tales for very small children. These are
fairy tdes of Andersen, Hauff-I do not want to insult the
repraentatives of the Arab countries and for this. reason I will
not say '"Arabian taIes" although I must admit that they are
charming both for their imagination and beauty of conception.
But it is suficjent to recall Andersm, Hauff or our Russian
fairy tales, for example, one about the wolf and Little Red Riding
Hood ( l ~ g k t e r ) how
,
the wolf wanted to devour Little Red
Riding Hwd and pretended to be her most devoted friend
(laughter) Well, and what were the results ? T b e wolf devoured
Littk Red Riding Hood. But since then "Little Red Riding Hoods"
have become so strong and powerful: that it is no longer easy
to devour them,let alone to deceive them.
If it is incorrect to prohibit tbe atomic weapon without cstab
lishing international control over the implementation of this
prohibition, it is
incorrect to establish i n t e t n a t i ~ dcontrol
without prohibiting the manufacture of the atomic weapon at the
same time. Thjs should be dl the more dmr because my control

.
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presuppases the existence of the object to which this mntro1
should be extended. We however are offered establishment of international runtroI, while prohibition of the atomic weapon and
even the very so-called disclosure and verification of infoxmation about the atomic weapon, about which the draft resoIutim
of the "Three" aIw speaks, is to be postpoaed for some inde6nit.e
time. True, this dare is quickly fixed. It is d e d sine die without fixing the day.
At previous sessions the Soviet Union also demanded pro.
bibition of the atomic weapon. But each time this demand of
the Soviet Union was rejected, and those rejecting it were not
uhamed at tbe same time to hold out the t h t of using atom
bombs. It is dear that it is good for those who prepare to attack
the Soviet Union to preserve some kind of advantage for themsdves in this matter, at first & advantage of monoplists, when
the United States considered itself h e monopolist ia this sphere,
and then, after such a monopoly was eliminated, the quantitative
advantage, for which the United States still has hopes.
In the reply to a Praud4 correspondent "On the Atomic
Weapon" the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
J. V, S k l i , pointed out that the United States would like to
have a monopoly of the production of atomic b b s aud have
t m h i ted opportunity to intimidate and blackmail other countries and that the proponents of the atomic bomb "may Bgree
to the prohibition of the atomic weapon anly if they see that they
B C ~
no longer mrmopolists."
To prove that the United States stan& for the prohibition of
the atomic weapon Mr, Acheson referred to the fact that in 1946,
in the commissiqn presided over by Acheson, 3aruch had propased to discontinue the manufacture of atom bombs and to
destroy the &sting atom h d s . MI. Acheson, however, said
nothing about the faci tlqt in advancing his proposal for the
pxobibitim of the atomic weapon Baruch made it dependent not
upon a respective international agreement but upon the internal
Iegislation of the United States. As for the de~tmaioaof the
atom bombs already produced-again werytbing was onIy an
empty phrase. Why, it is known to dl, at Ieast this should be
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Mr. Acheson, that this question of destroying stocks
of ready atomic weapons and atomic weapons which were being
completed was raised in 1947 in the Atomic Energy Commission
not by Baruch, but by the representative of the Soviet Union. This
proposal envisaged the destruction of the atomic weapon with
nuclear fuel being used solely for ppareful purposes. Then d1
the members of the Atomic Energy Commission, except the
representative of the United States, agreed with this plan. The
representative of Britain (Thomson), h a d a (McNaughton)
Brazil (Akrto), China (Wei) ,Australia (Hodgson) agreed with
l h i s plan at that time. The mIy me not to agree was the representative of the United States (Osbarn). Here we have an
answer as to how the Americans proposed to destroy atom bombs.
The representative of the United States Qsbom stated then that
the provisions of the international treaty on atomic energy must
be implemented step by step and that only at a definite stage of
the implementation of this treaty would liquidation of the
atomic weapon in me way or another be provided for. The proposal submitted by the USSR representative for the destruction of
manufactured atom bombs was rejmed. Thcse facts show that
wben the matter really reaches the point of prohibiting the
atomic weapon and destroying manufactured atom bombs, it
invariably encounters resistance on the part of the United States.
It has been so before; it will evidently be so now.
known to

.
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taken by his commission. He pointed out that this letter also
said at what stage of the drafting of the plan prohibition of the

atomic weapon would be necessary. Thiq however, is not the point
at issue at dl, but the point at issue is that no matter at what
stage this would be necessary, Mr. Acheson's commission recognized that the decision, no matter when it might be taken, would
be connected with msidemtions of high policy affecting the
m i t y of the United States and, as it is put in Mr. Acheson's

fetter, "must be made by out Government under ics conrstmttioaal
procases and in the light of all the fasts of the world situation."
What could this mean if not that when matters reach the
point of prohibiting the atomic weapon, although his might k
envisaged by any kind of international agreement either in the
form of the Baruch plan or my other document, the question of
the prohibition of the atomic weapon would be decided "in the
light of all the fa& of the wodd situation," i.e., irrespective of
plan or international agreement. It is absolutely impossible to
interpret this as Mr. Achem wodd like it, as a recognition of
the need for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon.
It is necessary to add to tbis that h e distinctive feature of the
Baruch p h consists p&ly
in the fact that the solution of the
question of prohibiting the at&
weapon can, with the heIp of
the stage system, be p p n e d far an indefinite time, Another
distinctive feature of this plan is that tbe production of atomic
energy in amounts that could seme for the production of tbe
atomic weapon, and in such a case would be recognized as
dangerous, is placed at the exclusive disposal of the intematiooaI
control agency and that all the atomic p h t s are placed in its

sole psession.
But what might tbis

inkemationd a p c y be? Here is what
B a d said h u t this, referring to the composition of this
agencg: "The personnel of the Authority should be recruited on
a h i s of proven competence hut a150 so far as possible on an
international basis,"
It follows from Banrch's statement that first of all these must
be people extremely competent in this field-it may bt: said in
advance that the Americans will dways argue that their sdentists like Lilienthd, Barnard, Thornas and others are the most
competent persons--that *ere are none more competent. And secondy, "so far r~ #ossibIe" the agency should be international.
Now if we were told that the United Nations Organhtion should
be "so fur 4s po~lible" intematiwnd, what would our attitude
be, although right now we already have something of the sort?
But we are not satisfied when in our international organization,
in the United Nations Organization, members of the A t h t i c Mac
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boss the whoIe show, when the United %tag of Amerim does
everything it wants in the United Nations. For iastance we say:
the United States of America was the h s t to raise the q d o n
of a r m duction at the General Assembly. Therefore, in all
justice, this question shaufd be taken up first at our session as
the United States was first to submit it. Fobwing the United
States we submitted our question "On Meaoures against the
Threat of Another World War and for the Strengthening of
Peace and Friendship among Nations." We demanded that it be
second on the agenda. But the United States delegation did not
agree to this, and this question was put fifth.
Now dections to the Security Council are to be held. Yugoslavia's term in the Security Cwncil is ending, Yugoslavk is a
Slav country. Under h e agreement in London seats ia the
Security Council should belong not only to representativs of
Western B u m p but also to a repmentative of Eastern Europe,
of SIav countries, and aIso to represmtatives of the Latin h e t i caa region, etc. In the past we demanded and we now demand that
according to the established tradition, to the gentlemen's agreement concluded in 1946, the candidate to the Security Council
should be proposed by the countries of the corresponding geographic region. Until 1949 this is what was done. but then they began to hinder the group of Slav delegations from carrying this out,
imposing their own candidate on them.
Last time they wanted to propose YugosIavia--to spite usthey propsed her and pushed her through. Now they have discovered a new "Slav" countrp--Greece ( h g b t e r ) . Aad they
want to impose this new "Slav" on us as a representative of
Eastern Europe, i.e., of the region to which the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Byelorussia and the Ukraine belong, and only
by agreement among whose representatives may a candidate to
the Security Council be proposed.
I n 1749 we objected to Yugoslavia for no other reason, except
that it bad vaulted over to the other camp and betrayed this
principle, not desiring to take into consideration the will of the
majority of states of this region which deprived her of the right
to daim to repmat the countries of precisely this xegion. This
29

iime we proposed Byelorussia for the Sgcusity h e i r , But the
Anglo-American blac propa Greece from the countries of
Eastern Europe. They also propose another "Slav" country, newly
ihvented for this c
h Philippines (irf~lghtm).
CoIJusion is in progress behind our back, a bargain with regard
to the elections to the h i t y Council: is being struck, and it ha
wen k n hinted to us hat their support of ByeIowir will
depend on how hactable we ate ia our today's speech. But I
must dedare that we will not bargain. We will @ht for our
right to propose our candidate and insist on his eldon-we
wiIl also expose the crafty technique of the violators of this
rigkt of ours under the Charter. By the way, this technique
is not so very crafty. Thus if mambea of such an international
organimtion as the United Nations conduct thtmsefves in this
manner here, then what can w e expect of a so-called intemahnd
control authority when the Amerimis themselves, Baruh for
instance, admit that this author* must be international onIg 30
fnr ar p o ~ ~ i b l stipulating
e,
that of course most competent prsons
should be in it. And who are these? Ammian atom mongers.

Very :competent persons" who h v e shown their "hpetence"
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki . . .
It is clear to us that this stipulation that the control zuthoritp
will be "so far as possible on an internationd basis" indicates that
there may be no such possibility. In any case there is no guarantee
whatever that there will be such a possibility. Thus it should be
dear that in cornpition this agency, as contemplated under the
Baruch-L'dientbal-Ach plan, wilt not be international: but
American.
Can there be any doubt as to the kind of decisions which will
be made by this so&
international control authoriq when
the matter concerns, for instance, the Soviet Union?
In his interesting b d t P e e W M and the Bomb Professor
Blackett points out with perfectly g w d foundatim that the
national composition of members of this contrd agenq over the
next 10 or 20 years would a s m e a major* of votes to the
course to which the United States wodd attach special importan*.
In order not to go into too much detail we dull m e d y say that
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under such cbmmmxa control of a l l the world reserves of

:

atomic energy w d d in faa be concentrated in the hands of
the United States Government, that it h e would have undivided
sway in this field, that it alone would determine the further line
of dweIopment of the atmic energy plants, permitting or refusing to permit other countries to p d u c e atomic energy on a
scale which the United States Government would consider against
its interests.
The very system of COII~MI proposed in the Baruch pian,
which does not stem from the economic requirements of the
vwious countries but exdusiwly from strategic considerations,
s p h for itself.
Professor Blacketr justly says: "It will k remembered that in
the Lirienthal FIm the major atomic plants were to be located

I

on strategic grounds, not according
need. How would the
number of plants, allocated, say, to America and Russia be determined? If it was according to relative need, America, with her
. . ample supplies of coal and oil, wouId receive few or none!
If the Atomic Dwdopment Authoritg made such a decision, America would certainly repudiate the whbfe scheme. But allocation on
strategic g m d s - would lead q d y to grave injustices. For
instance, Russia might find herself all&
the same number of
plants as America .
"These conditions make it probabIe that the United States
Government would not have proposed a scheme such as the
Atomic Development ~uthority-i€Ihey had not every confidence

.
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that tbe Western Powers wwlfd bE assured of a majority on
ADA."
As far inspeaion, it too would be compleiely under the contd
of the United States with all the resulting consequences. The
so-called "honest profession" of Oatises, of which Mr. Acheson
spoke bere, would no doubt I
x p t I y encouraged in work of
this inspection too, at least with regard to a l l the countries in
which the United States is interested and, aaturally, not least
of all, with regard to the Swiet Union and the People's Demwacies.
Indicating the biggest shtcomings of the Baruch p h , which

render it entirely unacceptable to seif-respecting s t a t e , it cannot
but be pointed out right here that this plan wouId be disz&ous
to the development of a p c e f u l economy, especially of thc
countries which need atomic energy for civilian purposes. But
for dl that the Baruch plan is incapable of muring real m t m I
if one is to hkliwe, for instance, the spokesman of the United
States Oslmm who declared pubIicly at the h t session that there
is not a single manber of the Atomic Enera Gmmissim who
M k ~ e sit possible to crate a p h excluding the possibility of
abuse and the psibility of an atomic war. O h m admowledgd
that in a situation with an international control authority owning
and dnhist&ing plants, potexpIosive malt, as formerly,
get into the hands of a state through seizure if the situation pxwes
practicaI1y hopeless.
And here such a plan is being d l e d tbe best p h that could
be framed and for many years a h d y attempb have kmade
to foist w other s t a t e this p h of control which is unsuitable
in reality.
Impsing bet plan w b i 4 as we see, pursues aims that have
nothing in common with international controI, they pointed out
the necessity of reconciliation with the fact tbat tbis plan is
diread against the sovereignty of other states. Whm we objected
to such an assertion directed sgaiast the state sovereignty of
independent counkis, we were told that it is unavoidable ia the
interests o£ higher aims. T h e higher aims, however, boil down
merely to assuring American monoplies domination in atomic
affairs.
Attempts were made to reproach us for our so-called rigorism
which, they allege, makes us ready to disregard the fate of
millions of people who may become victims of an atomic war
if no agreement is reached on a t d c control h a d on the
Baruch plan. But we have beady said that tbis plaa does not
answer the task of a t a b W g effective i n t d d control.
We have already repeaidly explained our position witb rewd
to sovereignty, pointing out tbat wery interaationd agreement
naturally demands certain limitation io this sphere. But it is m e
thing to limit sovereignty for truly common interests. It is another

to strive to limit and, men mdre, to completely cancel sovereignty
under cover of common interests while really pursuing the interests of one country, in this case of the United States, as is
m n t e m p k ~under the Baruch p h . Such so-called restriction
of sovereignty cannot be accepted by a single sensible person.
It is not superfluous to recall that even such an American
leader in the fieId of atomic weapon manufachue as Chester

Bamard, former president of the New Jerseg 3eU Telephone
Company, member of the State Department's Board of Consultants
on atomic energy contd, said in 1946, speaking of the Baruch
plan, that in accepting this plan the other countries would g d ually and voIuntariIy bave to repudiate considerable elements of
their sovereignty before the United States give up the atomic
bomb. Barnard added to this that it was diflidt to imagine less
favor&& conditions for successful negotiations between proud
and equal powers. In 1946 it was already cleat to him, as he
himself declared, that the chances that this American pIan would
be accepted were very slight.
Speaking of the Saviet proposals regarding international contml,Mr. Acheson referred to the remark in the five-power document of 1949 thmt the Sovief proposal would endanger international security. This of course has no foundation whatever, and
we have already refuted this time and again at previous sessions.
There are, however, a number of competent indications pointing out that it is the Baruch plan that d j endaqers p e w
because under it any red or imagined violalion of agreement: in
the opinion of the majority of the cmtiol agency could be used
to unleash a new world war.
It is a fact that the well-known Bullitt went so far as to consider t
k Soviet Government's decision to raise production of
steeI in our country to 60 million tons a year as proof of Soviet
aggression. Under the Baruch plan in action, it would not k
f i c u l t for Bullitt to push through a corresponding decision in
the control agency with all the consequences following from
such a decision.

*
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wouId like to aslr the authors and admates of
I theconclusion
draft molutmn of the "Three" reply m ehe foUowing
N

we

to

questions:
Do they agree that the G e n d Assembly should proclaim the
unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the wtabIishtnent of strict inkrnatiod mntml aver the implementation
of this prohibition?
Do they agree that the General Assembly should instruct the
Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to
prepre and submit to the Security CounciI by Februay I, 1952
a draft of a respective convention?
Do they agree that this convention should envisage measures
ensuring the implementation of the decision of the General
Assembly on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, discontinuation of its manufacture atsd.utilization of the d d y produced
atom bombs solely for civiIian purposes, and the estabIishment d
strict international control over the implementation of the above
convention 7
Do they agree h a t the General AwembIy should recogniae
that every sincere plan for a substantial reduction of all armed
forces and armaments must include the estabIishment of an
international control agencp within the framework of the Security
Council ?
Do they agree that the task of this agency should be control
of the reduction of all tgper, of armaments and armed forces, as
well as control to ensure that the decision to prohibit the atomic
weapon is strictIy and scrupulwsly observed, and that this international agency should dixlose data on all armed forces, incIuding semi-military forces, securifq forces and poIice, as well as alI
armaments, iincluding the atomic weapon, and having also in
view effective internationd inspeclion carried out by decisions of
the h e international control agency?
FinaUy, do they agree that the international agency for control over the pmhibition of the atomic weapon should immediately
after the conclusion of the convention inspect a I I the enterprises for the manufacture and storing d atomic weapns with the

1
I

object of verifying the implementation of the convention on
the prohibition of the atomic weapon?
An dinnative reply to d these questions will serve as the
genuine and best p m f of the willingness to prohibit the atomic
weapon and establish genuine international control to ensure
the implementation of this decision.
We wodd be happy, and not onIy we but all the pace-ldng
p p l e . wwld be happy, if we meived an &imative, clw
and exact reply to h e questions of ours.
At the same time the reply to these questions will show who
shpuid d y he held responsible for the rejection d the unconditional prohibition of the atomic w e a p and the establisbent

of strid international control.
The delegation of the USSR believes that the draft resolution
submitted by the delegations of the United Stata, Great Britain
and France cannot in its present form serve its dedared purpose.
This draft resolution requires important amendments which the
USSR delegation is presenting simultaneously for the consrideratioa of the First Committee.
W e hope that thse mmdments, which in our view are indispuAIe, will be adopted a d that the way wilt thus be opened
for agreement on such important questions as the reduction of
armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, with the establishment of strict international control to enforce the prohibition
of atomic weapons and to etlsure real, honest and scrupulous observance of the decision ta reduce armaments and armed forces.

Speech in the Political Committee

November 30, 1951
Mr. C h a h i q Messrs. Ddegaks:

w

when it is
tsecessarp to summarize certain results, draw conclu~ions

E have already reached the point in our work

arid chart a further path in the solution of the problems fat- us.
Under these conditions it is especially important to pick out
the main, decisive questions discussed during the general debate.
It is important to make nm efforts in order to define most fuily
and clearly one's stand on quations that arouse disputes and differences and to make we of a11 the opportuaities for eliminating
the obstacles hindering a proper mutual understahding of these
stands. This is dl the more essential because in the course of
polemics, in the heat of, so to say, verbal battles, a cmsiderabre
number of all kinds of extraneous layers have been formed, without whose removal it is frequently d&lt
to find a proper 50111t h of the problem. Zhis means that ia summarizing the results and in working on the precise definition of some or other
p e p , it is impossible to proceed without removing these layers, without casting aside weergthing that does not bear a direct
reiation to these important issues and can merely hamper the attainment of decisions agseed upon, evqihing that does not facilitate a calm analysis and proper conclusions. This ;Jso means that it:
is necessarp to clear the facts fram distortions and to restore them
to their true, real fwrn and significance, which alone can ensure
their proper undelrstandig.
It should k said, however, that the authors ofthe draft resolution of the "Three" and certain supporters of this draft have
frequently disregarded the demand outlined above, although they
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have given ammnces that thq. are allegedly striving for atlaining
an agreed program and are guided solely by the interesb of truth,
by the interests of tht matter. Such assurances can in no way be
reconciled with the spepches of certain delegates who bave considered it proper to M their speeches, spiced with considerable
doses of malice and dander, with dl kinds of fables and banal
attacks against us which have long since becoqne tedious. This is
unfortunately being repeated at every session, and not infrequently the same tricks are being employed, the same so-catled
facts are being used, the same quotations are being cited, notwitbstanding the fact that such amoks have already been repulsed
d i m , the tricks q o s e d , the false statements refuted, the ignorance of their autboxs exposed, and the authors themselves put in
their place.
Whether one wants it or not, one again has to take up such
sallies of these Messcs. delegates. This time too I am forced to
dwell on the speeEh of the former French Minister of the Interior,
M. Jules Mocb, who, speaking on November 26, piled up a hcap
of absurd and slanderous JIegations regarding the -@ion
and
"annexation by Russia." as he put it, of some kind of territories
before the war and at the beginning of the war.
M. M d stated in his speech that a repetition of tendentious
assertions umses mistrust and that this mistrust, entertained by
him and people of a like mind, grows as they acquaint themselves with c d n methods of the Soviet regime. He attempted
to vilify our methods whose substance rLIeged1y consists in cond i n g the truth and in inather mortd sins. To substantiate this
slanderous invention of his, Moch went on to cite a quotation
from the work of our great teactrer V. I. tenin, "Lejt-Witrg"Cornmrmis~m,an Infmtih Di~arder,He, of course, doctored it accordingly, tearing out s e v d phrases from the entire context and
thus resorting to obvious fahifieation.
Mmh, however, hars become a victim of the falsification which
the American representative Austin permitted himself to indulge
in right here in Paris three years ago. I cannot help but recall
that Austin Iikmise ventured to quote
distorting and mutilating the real text aad the meaning of this q~otation-'~I;ef#-Wing"
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Comm~ninn,con Infmiiie Disorder accordin& to the crib p ~ pared for him by tbe officialsof the State Deparbaent, who did not
understand, and of course did not want honestly to
out, the
substance of this qtlestion,
flight there and then, three years ago, this base falsification of
Mr. Austin was exposed. Right there and then the t
a
t was restored to its original form and it was proved that the tactics wbicb
"Left-Wing" Commnnitn, an Ittfmtile Disordw recommends
the a d v a n d represenlativm of wo&ers' p t k s to mpIoy have in
view the circumstances when in the struggle against the labor
movement "thwe gentlemen, the 'leaders' of oppoW s m , wiI1
resort to wery trick of bourgeois diplomacy, to the aid of bourgeois governments, the priests, the police and the courts, in order
to insult>bait, and persecute" advanced representatives of the
working claw.
It is pointed out in the corresponding place in "'kft-Wing"
Comm~~nism,
rm Infmiile Disordw that it is necessary 'hot tn
feu diffidties, not to fear the pinprih, chicanery, insults and
persecution by the 'leaders' (who, being opporhmista md socialc h 8 u v ~ are,
, in most cases, directly or indirdy connected
with the bourgeoisie and the police) . . ." (M.Moch, pay attention
with the police.)
This is what is taught by hhmh-Leninism
this great
doctrine, this great invincible banner of the working class, of all
working mankind.
It should bc recalled that methods of falsifying quotations
were m r t e d to in I948 by Austin, McNeil and their friends, in
order, in addition to eveqthing else, to divert the attention of
pubIic opinion from tbeir fabrications and specifralIy from the fabrication known as "Protocol M,"which was needed in order to give
the American and British ompation authorities in Western Germany the pretext for raining down repressions on the democratic
organizations of Western Germany, going so far as to prohibit the
People's Congress, intensify the pressure on trade unions, and

...

-
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so on.

Thiee years ago Austin gave currency to his falsification out of
sympathy for the M weighing down the German and French
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police. This year the former French Minister of the Interior, M.
Jules Moch, tried to employ this same tri& evidently prompted
by similar aspirations and motives to support the police measures against advand representatives of the working class in his
country.
My colleague, chairman of the Polish delegation, Werblowski
restoring the truth, bas already given Jules Moch a lesson in handling quotations, advising him to md more closely the sources from
which be takes quotations. But this perhaps is a diffilt task for
M. Mach for he evidently in general prefers to use secondhand
quotations, not king in the least disturbed by the fact that these
quotations are presented in a distorted and faIs3ed way.
With such tmtment of facts and documents it is, of course,
impossible for the discussion to yield any kind of fruitful results.
It is characteristic that M. Mmh said nothing else, if one omits his
statement to the effect tbat the United States, Britain and Fxance
could elf& a reduction of armaments
he used the word "disarmament," which does not at all correspond to the propais
contained in the draft resolution of the "Three" - only if full
gua~anteesof sincerity were submitted. What these guarantees
should consist of M. Moth did not take the pains to state.
Notwithstanding the fact that M. Moch spoke on behalf of the
Three - the United States, Great Britain and France - representatives of the United States and Great Britain have taken the flwr
after him and each me of them has also spoken on khalf of the
Three.
In his speech the United States representative, Mr.Jessup, has
repeated the attempt to give assurance of the striving of the
United States to lessen the tension in international relations and,
as he put it, to advance along a peaceful path of negotiations.
It is not the first time that we have heard statements by the
delegations of the United State, Great Britain and France about
the readinesg &egedIy to reach agreement with the Soviet Union
and assurances of the dmire to lower the temperatwe of the political atmosphere. We have already pointed to the peculiar division
of labor in the camp of the A h t i c bloc. On the one hand the
representatives of this bloc at the AssembIy do not spare words

-
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and coopetation, the need to relieve the tension in
international relations, disappointment with the a+d
unyieldingness of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, just as r e s p sible, and sometima even more responsible, representatives of the
countties of this bloc d e k hcendiary, bllirose speeches, up to
the p i n t of directly d i n g for an attack on the Soviet Unian and
the PeopIe's Democracies. N o one here will dare to deny thcse
facts. T h e entire world is confronted with these facts, and let
myone try to deny these facts.
While here in the First Committee Mr. Jessup ddivered his1
pious speech about peace and cooperation, another United States
representative, the well-known John Foster DulIes, adviser of the1
State Deprbne~tand one of the main moving spirits of Amerimo '
foreign policy, on his part made a spcech of a directly opposite
nature at the annual dinner of the Advertising Council in Detroit.
The New Yurk H ~ d Tribrme
d
reports that in this speech DuIles)
called for the ueation of a striking force of great power diitributed in canvwimt places along the Soviet perimeter which, according to DulIes, is more essential than defensive forces for
everg nation allegedly threatened by Russia, In this speech Dune
d e c W that next year the United 8 a t would
~
spend k t 60
bilIioa doUars on mmwmnt..He added: ' W e dare not consider
that this present effort wdI do the job once arid for dl or that
we a n predetermine the year of greatest danger. The p a r af
g e t danger will be the year we relax. W e s h d have to fmd
a $icy
that can be sustained for many years without relaxing."
To relax means to halt the armaments drive; it means to red m , to cut if not altogether to discontinue the pqration
for another war. Xt is this relaxing that, according to Mr.Dullrepresents the greatest danger.
Mr.Jessup said it was necessary to compare the speech of the
Secretary of State Mr. Achmn with the speech of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyshinskg both in substance and
in spirit to pe&e
the aspirations of both sides. But would it
not be better to cumpare Mr. Jessup's speech with the speech of
John Foster Dull= to perceive the real direction of the foreign
p
o
e
l of the United States, to perceive where the reactionary
e!.out peace

-

-

r

form in the United States are d y driving mattus, what they
are d n g upon? At last Mr.Dulles has decided to admit o@y
that the United Skates, which heads the aggressive Atlantic bloc,
is preparing not for defense, but for attadc, that a strilung force
of great power distributed in convenient places along the perime t a of the USSR is bang (rested and that this is mote important
and essedal than defensive forces. Is it not clear that Mr.Ddcs
has at Iast dotted the i's, giving fresh proof of the aggressive nature
of the fmign pohq of the United States?
Can this fact be ignored while listening to the h
@ speeches
of the Amerian representatives at the Assembly? And d m the
reveldon of Dde,&cia1 representative of the Stake Department, mean anytbiag, is it not worthy of notice and does it not
cause the necessity of being wen more on tbe alert after these
speeches than was necessarg More?
If our speeches are ta be compared for their "substance and
spirit,'? tbea while making this comparison it is absolutely necessary to add to the speeches of Acheson and jessup the speech of
W e , who in the same s p c h has also j d e d the u n p l ldled violation of international: law and international agreements
cornmined by the American Congress when it adopt& the Mutual
Semi9 Ast of October 10, 1951, with Kernten's ameodrraent appropriating 100 million dollars for financing the subversive and
terrorist activity of its agents against the USSR and the People's
Democr~.

I
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THE
United Stahs reprrwntrtive Mr. Jerrup bas attempted m
adduce
in support of the draft of the Three.
some arguments

H e has undeaaken this to prove that the Governments of the
United States, Great Britain and Frmm proposed to the representative of the Soviet Unioa here in Paris that the four Foreign
Ministea meet and discuss questiaas which could facilitate the
relieving of i n t d a n d tension. Mr: Jasup said here that t h y
proposed that the agenda of such a meeting include an item under
the heading: Existing Ievefs of armunents and armed foand
the measures to k adopted jointly by the USSR, the United State,
Great Britain and France for the internatid control and re41

duction of armed forces and amments. Jessup said that the meeting was not held and that the three Powers - France, the United
Stater, and Great Britain - decided to devote their efforts to preparing a sound, progressive, as he said here, proposal for disamamerit to be submitted for the considedon of the General AS-

sembly.
Mr. Jessnp's memory, however, is failing him. It was not the
representative of the United States but the representative of the
USSR at the Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris
who proposed to include on the agenda the question of the immediate mmtnencement of the reduction of armed forces of thc
four Powers: the USSR, the United States, Great Britain d
France. As fox the representative of the United States, incidentdy,this was the very same Mr. Jessup, he came out with objections to including this item on the agenda. And the United States
delegate, supported by tbe ~epresentativesof Great Britain and
France, adhered to this stand until the very end of the codereace
of Deputy Foreign Ministers.
We may be told that the question of the reduction of armaments demanded the preliminary dution of the question of the
level of armed forces. But the precise point is that by insisting
on discussiag the level of amed forces the representatives of the
United States, Great BriWia and France thus tried to e d e the
qucstion of the reduction of armed farces.
Why, it is not fortuitous that at one meeting of the Deputy

Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris the French representative
Pam& said that the French Government considers it necessary to
aert certain efforrr if9 the sphere of amamenlr and p e s e l y for
thir redon France could not agree to the draft ageada containing
a formulation about the reduction of armed forces of the four
Powers.
The representatives of the United States and Great Britain
adhered to a similar stand and they categoricauy rejected
the proposal of the Soviet Union to include on the agenda the
question of the reduction of armaments and armed forces,
inchding the armaments and armed forces of the USSR, the
United States, Great Britain and France. The representatives
42
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of these three Powers stubbornly insisted on including, instead
of this, an item sbout the existing level of armaments.
It is sufficient to ponder over this formulation to become
convinced how far from the truth is Mr. Jessup's allegation
that at the conference held in Paris from March to June 1951
the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and
Great Britain proposed to d i m s the question of the reduction of armed forces. No,they did not propose this. The representative of Gxeat Britain, Davies, defending the formulation
of the 'Three" concerning the level of armed forces, stated
that it was still not known in which direction the question of
armaments should be solved: in the direction of their reduction or, on the contrary, of their increase. Even at that time
Davies already explained that the control mentioned in the
proposals of the three Powers should be understood not as
control over the reduction of armaments but as control over
their lerei.

Compare, on the one band. these two pronouncements of
Mr. Davies; on the other hand, compare the statements made
by Davies with the pronouncement of Parodi, who at that
time represented France at that conference, and you will see
what this formula-the question of the existing levd of armed
forceemeans and whether it resembles the proposal for the
reduction of armed forces.
I will say to this d i d y : it does not resernbie it because,
as we shall further see, the "leveI of armed forces" i s not a
"reduction of armed forces," This level may mean, as Mr.
Davies said at that time, either an increase or o reduction,
and far tbis reason he objected to including on the agenda
the question of the reduction of armaments.
This is the history which is now king repeated bere. This
is w h t Mr.Acheson said. These are two sides of one and the
m e coin: the armaments which they are taking up in Rome
and the "disarmament," to use their language, which they are
taking up in Paris. They want to reconcile these two tasks.
But, gentlemen, we are sufficientIy experienced political leaders to understand that these two tasks are irreconcihble, that
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only an impasse can be created by tying simultansowIp to
arm with one hand and "to disarm" with the other hand.
I
. Now Mr.Jessup states that the d ~ f redution
t
of the 'Three"
about the so-called arms reduction is a continuation of the line
pursued by the United States, Great Britain and France at the
Paris Confemce of Deputp.Poreign Ministen. This is indeed
the case, but this means that the present draft of the resoIutian of the "Three" is just as far removed from the task oE
reducing armaments and anned forces as the stand the three
Powers took at the Faris Conference of Deputy Foreign
Ministers. And there this stand meant: no talk whatever or,
if you wish, nothing but talk about arms reduction, but no
reduction of armaments whatever; it is necessary, they said,
first to determine the level of armed forces, and only then
would it be clear whether to reduce arms or to arm.
But judging from everything tbat Mr, Jmup said fuaher
on about the telative size of armed forces and armaments of
the Soviet Union--of which I shall speak further--there
could be no talk whatever about a reduction ~f armaments
because the American, British and French delegations and
those suppoxting t h m are now making every effort to prove
tbat the existing lwel of armaments is such that if anyone
should reduce armed fa- and armammb, it should be only
the Soviet Union.
ConsequentIy they already say in advance that they will
not reduce anything. A11 the more, they will not reduce by
om-third.
1 shall dweil more on this aspect of the matter further on
but will now limit myself to what I have said, bdieviag that
this is quite sufficient to re-establish the real state of d i r s
and show the banlrrupty of the statemats made by the United
States delegate hi at the Paris Conference the United States,
Great Britain and Prance aUegedly defended the need for
reducing armaments and armed forces. They not only did not
defend such a need but fought against the recognition of such
a need. They wouId not agree to include such an item on the
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agenda of the Foreign Ministers Council for which the four
deputy ministers were to prepare an appropriate agenda.
Therefme Mr. Jessup's statement regarding the Confamce
. of Deputy Foreign Ministers k sePiwsIy at variance with the
truth. just as far removed f ~ a mthe truth are Mr. Jessup's
as well as Mr. Lloyd's disquisitions an a number of other
questions: on the size of the armed forces of tbe USSR and
the United States, aggre&on in Korea, pxoposd for the prohibition of atomic weapons, on the Information Bureau, and
so on and so fotih.
Everything that has been said here by Messrs. Jessup and
Lloyd on the above questions can o d y be explained by their
desire to divert attention from the principal important issues
demadng serious attention and to draw us into a discussion
of those questions which have no direct relation to the matter
and aan only complicate the situation ia our committee and
heat up the poIitical atmosphere, as has been said here.
1 do not consider it necessary to dwell on all these questions
but will touch only on some.First of dl 1 s h d deal with
Lloyd's allegation that the Soviet Union has not introduced a
single constructive proposal on the question of aid to underdeveloped countries. In this connection I should like to recall,
for inslance, the fact that at the previous session of the General Assembly, during the discussion of the 20-year program
for attaining peace through the United Nations, the delegation of the USSR submitted a petfectry constructive proposal
that in the further elaboratioh of this program provision be
made: "To render t d m i d aid to ecwrcdcally backwaxd
countries, if not exdusiveIy, then at least mainly, through the
United Nations. I n doing so, to proceed from the fact that
such aid must be directed toward promoting the development
of the internal xesources of the economically W a r d
countries, of their national industry and agriculture, toward
strengthening their economic independence. and should not
tx d e conditiond upon demands for politid, economic or
military privileges for the countries rendering such Jd."
It should be added that the delegation of Great Britain

&.
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voted against this proposal. And this notwithstanding the fact
that an analogous proposal submitted on the initiative of the
Soviet Union was adopted by the Economic and Social fiuncil
in 1949. Moreover, last year the Soviet Union also submitted

a proposal that the General Assembly recognize that the dcveloprnent of international trade must be effected without discrimination, on the basis of equafrty and respxt for the
souereiguty of all countries aad without interference in the
internal affairs of other states.
It was no one else but Younger, then representing Great
Britain, who declared that this proposal of ours was "Soviet
propaganda." Moreover, Younger stated that the British delegation, perceiving insincerity behind the inte~tioasof the
USSR in this proposal, wouId vote against it. The British
delegation did vote against this proposd.
Mr. Lloyd preferred to keep silent about all this. But this
is exactly how matters stood. It turns out that the Soviet
delegation introduces constructive proposah of which Mr.
Lloyd speaks, and the British delegation rejects them.
The h v e proposals dearly express our policy. Great
Britain's policy is dearly expressed in her attitude toward these
proposals, as well as in the well-known way in which British
monopolies treat underdeveloped countries and ia the ~ t i v ities of such monopolies as, for example, the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company. This is how matters stand, Mr. Uoyd, as regards
construcfive proposals.
As for the participation or don-participation of the USSR
in various internationa1 organizations of which Mr. Uoyd has
likewise spoken, first of all it is necessary to consider what
these organizations represent. There is, for example, tbe
International Refuge Organization. lnsteud of facilitating

the repatriation of refuges, this organization has become an
office for hiring and supplying plantation owners with cheap
contracted labor, for reuuiting traitors as memaaria and
organizing armed groups for subversive activity and & t a p
within the USSR and the People's Democracies. It is for the
cncouragetnent of this criminal activity, for direct partiup46

tion, 1 wodd say, in this criminal activity that the United
States has now decided to appropriate lW million dollars.
As for the international trade orpoitation, at the Fifth
Session of the General Assembly we already stated that the
Charter of this organization does not correspond to the
interests of many countries and that if the necessary amendments were introduced into the Charter the USSR might be
able to join it. This statement, however, has bad no effect so
far. The USSR takes an active part in international organizations that are meritorio-for
example in the World MeteoroIogical Organization, the Universal Postd Union and others.
This seems su5dent to reveal the reverse side of the statements made here Iast time by Mr. Lloyd.
I wodd abo like to dwell on the statement of Mr. Jessup
regarding the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the
United States.
Mr. Jessup spoke here at length about the atmd forces of
the USSR and countries friendly to the USSR. He tried to
compare the numericat strength of the armed forces of the
USSR and the United States, stating in particular that the
armed forces of the United States did not exceed l,joo,ooO
men by 1950. In doing so Jessup however preferred to keep
silent about the fact that in his April message to Gngiess
the President of the United States had already pointed out
tbat in the past 10 months the United States had more than
doubled its armid forces and that they would be brought up
to 3,500,000 men, not counting the 2,000,000 men in different
military reserve formations and national guard units, and this
without the armed forces of Great Britain. France, Italy and
other countries which are members of the Atlantic bloc.
Turkey alone, it seems, is preparing to put up an army of
400,000 men if she is at let finally accepted by the Atlantic
bloc. If all these numbers are added up, if account is taken
of the American and British navies, the American miIitary
bases, the American stocks of atom bombs accumulated during
these years under cover of talks about internationa1 control,
it should become dear to anyone chat Jessup's arithmetical
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operation does not in reality correspond to tkre figures whic
he manipulated. As for the numerical strength of the arm
forces of the Soviet Union, as 1 k v e already pointed out i
my speech at the General Assembly, it is half of the numerica
strength of the armed forces of the United Sttes, Grea
Britain and France.
If you want to know exactly, please sign the agreement
which we propose for the reduction of armaments and armed
forceq probibition of the atomic weapon and c9tablisbmeat
of international control+nd we will lay all the figures on the
table, even to the last machine gun, to the last soIdier, and
then you will see what our armed forces are like and whether
your judgment is right, Now, however, it is too early to s p d
of this for two reasons: firstly, because you dispIay a remarkable
knowledge of our armed force-the result of the work by
the representatives of these countries in the Soviet Union in
the dipIomatic sphere-and secondly, you maintain that this
preeiseIp corresponds to the fact. Hence the task is solved.
We do not want to disappoint you one way or moeher.
And 50 let us sign the agreement right here at this very
same table; let us sit down and lay on the table, we, all our
figures; and you, your figures.
And in face of such facts we are told here that the proposal
of the USSR for reduction of the armed forces af the five
Gxcat Powers by one-third will allegedly create some kind of
an advantage for the Soviet Union, and objections are raised
against this proposal. But what do they put up against our
proposal? This can be seen from the third point of the draft
resolution of the "Three." They propose:
1. To instruct the commision to draw up proposals which
will be incorporated in the draft treaty on the balancd reduction of all armed forces and armaments.
2. This reduction of armed forces and umaments should be
brought to a level sufficient for defense.
3. The system of this *'disarmamenti*should include progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis,
48

covering dl types of armaments, including also the atomic
weapon.
4. The verification should be h t d on e k t i v e internatiod
inspectio~
5. As regards the atomic weapon, they again put forth the
Baruch plan, which allegedly envisages the estal " '
t of
international control over atomic energy and allegedly can
ensure the prohibition of the atomic weapon.
It should be noted that the main point in these proposals
is the establishment of the level sufficient for defense and the
so-died progressive disclosure and verification, or, as Mr.
Achaon said, "disdamm and veribation by stages."
As for the "level of the armed forces" tbis is an old acquaintance of ours. This is that very same lwei of m e d forces
which was so d o u s l y advocated at the Paris Conference of
Foreign Ministers by the representatives of the United
States, Great Britain and Frarrcc, who counterpoised the level of
armaments and armed foxces to the reduction of armaments and
axued forres.
Here again the question arises as to what is to serve as r
criterion for establishing this level, Mr. Acheson tried to
give an answer to this question. But, honestly speaking, he
could not produce any sort of a serious and comprehensible
answer. He said, for example, that a "great country has r
great many people and therefore can d o r d and will have a
greater army than mother country." But right there and then
he added h a t stU it would be necessary to impose
I am citing Mr. Acheson - a %at limitation kyond wbich no country
is permitted to go no matter bow great it is, irrespeclive of
wbat it can do, irrespective of how vast, according to its
words-this remark of Mr. Acheson is very strang+its territory is, how numerow its popuhon is and how many pmbh it has. So wbat do we get? It is p r o w to establish as
a criterion a level depending on the size of the county, its
population, and so on, but it is said, nevertheless, that no
matter how big the country is, we wiIl limit it to a attain
n&r
which evidently will not be in proportion either to its
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area, length of frontiers, size of its population ar other
politica1 conditions which. for example, consist of whether it
. is separated from other countries by an ocean 3,000 miles
wide, whether its immediate neighlmrs are friendly or, on the
contrary, hostile states, and so an and so forth. Irrespective
of rlI this-although this country is larger, although all
factors requiring tbat it k given a bigger army are on hand
-we wit1 not give it a bigger army; we will limit it.
It is dear tbat with such a reservation concerning strict
limibtion, the entire meaning of this so-called criterion is
lost* the entire meaning of defining the lore1 of the armed
forces of which the draft resolution of the "Thee" speaks is
last. But no less important is the fact that the very definition
of the level of the armed forces suficient for defense, according to the draft of the 'Three," sh~1~1d
be assigned to the
commission which will itseIf have the right to decide whether
the given number of armed forces is needed or not by m e
state or another for its defense. It means that for the defense
of my State someone else, wt reckoning with us, with our
demands, opinion and position, will define the number of
the armed forces which we wiI1 be graciously permitted to
have. Of course, irrespective of how this matter will be tegarded by the country concerned, this commission will simply
tell each state what quantity of armaments and what armed
forces it is d o w d to have and what resources it can use for
these purposes. And this Mr. Acheson called in his speech
"a mutually agreed upon program."
Can this entire scheme of defining the Ievel of the armed
forces sufficient for defense be comiderd redly serious,
especially if account is taken of the fact that the commission
itself and all its measures have to be carried out io conformity
with the well-known Acheson-Baruch plan, according to
which the so-called inkmational control agency can only be,
and will be, nothing more than an American control agency,
that is, an agency whose petsoanel will consist of people able
to carry through the fine of the United States in settling a11
questions of foreign policy?
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As for "progressive disclosure and 'verification" or "reveab
ing and d c a t i o n by s t a p , " to use Acheson's terminology,
I will merely say that this measure barrow& from the
Baruch plan caanot facilitate the solution of the task.
Even in the American press sober voices are heaid warning
against such a method of so-called reduction of armaments
and armed forces. Attention is drawn to the fact that the
principle of a census of armaments by stag& was one of the
biggest obstacles to attaining control over atomic energy.
And this is true; similarly true also is the remark of certain
organs of the American press that because this psinupie was
politically unfeasible from the very outset, it has became an
anachronism. After the Ameritan monopoly of the atomic
weapon was destroyed, after Russia made the first expiosioo
of the atom bomb,it should have become dear that the Russians
already had the necessary information. For this and for other
weighty reasons the principIe of stages sbodd have been
h d o n e d , the American press states,
"The system af stages" is a dead formula.
But the authors of the draft resoIution of the "Three" continue to insist on their dead formuks, although they try to
present them as the very latest method for solving questions
that interest us. This method borrowed from the Baruch plan
is not only old but also unsuitable, and herein Iies its main
shortcoming. This shortcoming fatally stamps the entire draft
resoIution of the "Three," from which these "stages" or this
"progressive disdosure" should be eliminated.
Mr. Lloyd tries to prove that the so-called United Nations
plan, or more correctly speaking, the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, envisages prohibition of the atomic weapon.
Wherein does he perceive such a prohibition? Let us look
at the draft resolution of h e "Three." In the &aft resolution
this m a t h is mentioaed thm times
in the preamble, point
3A and in point 3D. The preamble merely contains a reference
to effective international control over atomic energy to ensure
the prohibition of atomic weapons and the utilization of
atomic energy exdusively far peaceful purposes. Thus this is

-
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a mere statement of the aim to lx kept in mind when drawing

up the plans outlined in the preamble. But to point out the
aim, such as the prohibition of atomic weapons, does not
yet mean prohibiting atomic weapons. Therefore the preamble
consists of empty words binding no one to do anything. It
merely states the aim, the task--to probibit--but it is not
prohibition at all. Therefore the actuaI prohibition is being
put off. It is not declared at all. We are not king msked
to adopt s decision prohibiting the atomic w e a p now. And this
is where it differs from our proposds, for we p r o p dearly and
simply that a decision to prohibit atomic weapons and establish
international control be adopted right now, right here, at this
session of he General Assembly. And the praclicd naeasures
should be set forth in the convention to be drawn up by February
1, 1952, and so on and so forth.
Thete is a big difference between the two fomdations of the
question.
Therefore, a11 we have in the preamble is the stutemmf of tbe
aim which shouM be kept in mind whik drawing up the plans
mentioned in the preamble, but we do not have the prohibition of
atomic weapons.
Point 3A instructs the disarmament commission to draw up proposals which will be incorporated in the draft treaty on the regulation, iimitation and b c e d reduction of all armed forces and
dl arrnamente. Further on it mentions the principles by which the
commission sbodd be guided, and these indude the principles
requiring the atablishmeat of effective international control ensuring the probibition of atomic weapons. Point 3D indicates
that in formulating the propals for the above-mentioned treaty,
the United Nations plan for control over atomic energy, i.e., the
previously mentioned Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthalplan, should be
t

h

as a basis.

And we are being told that all this stands for the prohibition
of the atomic weapon although, of course, it is p e r f d y clear to
everyone that the prohibition of the atomic weapon Is not in question at all.
It is impossibIe for anyone who is truthful and unbiased to
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deny that not a single one of the above-enumerateditems contains
a p m p d which d d be regarded as a declaration of the prohibition of atomic weapons, at probibision of atorplir weapons,
Unable to oppose anything to the indisputable fact that the
draft resolution of the "Thre*' d m not contain prohibition of
the atomic weapon, provided one does not confuse km, acouragement, desire, instruction to draw up a proposal for the prohibition of atomic weapons with d probibilion of atomic weapons,
Lloyd, spe.&mg of our pr+,
tries to depict the matter as if
we want every state to declare that it will discontinue the manufacture of atomic bombs and destroy those already rnanufactud,
and he adds that the Swiet Union evidently hoIds that in this manner prohibition will be achieved.
But where did Mr. Lloyd get all this, we would Like to ask.
on what basis d m he attribute lo the Soviet Union sorrPething
we never said? On what basis does he do this when he has
before him our amendments and, in particular, our amendment to the Erst poht of the operative part of the three-power
draft which contains nothing resembling what Mr. Lloyd
a d k s to us here?
I am, therefore, compelled to call to mind tbe text of our
proposal on this matter hoping that you will immediately
perceive the enormous difference between Lloyd's statement
and ours.
Here is the text of our propowl:
"The General Assembly, recognizing the use of the atomic
weapon as a weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of
people to be cantrary to the conscience and honor of the
peoples and incompatible with membmship in the United
Nations, declares the unconditional prohibition of the atomic
weapon and the establishment of strict international control
over the implementation of this prohibition."
This is far removed from what Mr. Lloyd said here. It is
not each state which proclaims something or other, but the
Assembly which does the proclaiming. And it does not proclaim
that we wiIl no longer manufacture bombs and destroy those
already manufactured, but something entirely different. And
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that there may be no- doubt that the matter is not so simple
as perhaps Mr. Lloyd would have liked to depict it when he
spoke of wr propals, I wilt cite the second paragraph of this
proposal :
"Tbe General AssembIy instructs the Atomic Energy and
ConventionaI Armaments Commission to prepare and submit
by February 1, 1952 for consideration of the Security Council
a draft convention envisaging measures that ensure fulfillment
of the decisions of the General AswmbIy on the prohibition
of the atomic weapon, discontinuation of its production and
the utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom bombs
already produced, and on the establishment of strict international: control over the implementation of the above convention."
This is our proposal and it does not in the least resemble
what Mr. Lloyd, faIsifying our proposd, said here-may he
forgive me for the frank expression-falsifying.
And we submit this as the first point of the draft resolution.
Of course, it is passibIe to say: "We will not accept it." But then
it is necessary to say: "Wedo not desire to prohibit the atomic
weapon." Or it is possible to say : 'We want to prohibit the atomic
weapon." But in that case why not accept our proposal 7 Without
equivmtion, without ambiguity, without reservations!
Just think how the whole world will m a if we leave this hall
at some moment -claiming: "The atomic Bomb hnr bee^ PoAibited!"
Do you want this? Then say so.
y o u wilI not say so? Then that meam you do not want it.
There can be no two positions here, and reconciliation between
these two opposite stands is also impossible. And no verbal evasions, no legal subterfuges will help anyone hide the truth from
the anxious eyes of the millions upon millions of people throughout the world who desperately long to hear the sacred words
emerge from t h e walls announcing the prohibition of the atom
bomb, the unconditional prohibition of the atom bomb, datruction of all atom bombs, establishment of cankrol, drawing up of a
convention where aH this is said, and, after the convention shall.

haw b m signed, the immediate verification of aU atomic estab-

lishments, as

we

propose.

This is our pro@ and of course Mr. Lloyd has read it. All
the more surprising that he set forth our p r o p d in such a distorted form. Indeed, is Lloyd's e r t i o n true tbat according to
our pioposaI it is sfideat for every state to announce that it is
discontinuing the manufacture of the atomic weapon wbm our
pmposal clearly says that the Gened Assembly d d a m the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishmeot of strict
international control? Does Mr. Uoyd not understand that our
proposal does not testrict itself merely to a decision of the Genera1
Assembly announcing the unconditional prohibition of the atomic
weapon and the establishment of international control, moreover
strict international control at that? Does he not see, reading the
text of our proposal, that under it the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission must prepare and submit by
February 1, 1952 a draft convention envisaging measures that
ensure he implementation of the General Assembly's decisions
to prohibit the atomic weapon, to &abM international control
and a number of other measures indicated in the second paragraph
of our proposd quoted ahove?
, Thus Mr. Lloyd imputes to us what we do not propose, representing it as our s o - d e d proposal, and he keeps silent about what
we really propose.
In rditg, 3 repeat, we propose that the General Assembly dedare the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon, that
m appropriate convention be drawn up, that this convention envisage measures ensuring the observance of the General Assembly's decisims on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, measures
for the discontinuation of the production of atom bombs, utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom b d s already produced
and measures far the establishment of stria international c o n t d
over the implementation of this convention.
And we are toid: Every state announces that 'it is discontinuing
the manufacture of atom bombs and destroying those already
manufadud, and it is thus that prohibition of the atomic weapon
will be achieved. This is a oricatu re. This is a farce. But we are
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not in the mood for farces or for jokes. W e want to discuss s d ousiy a serious matter and to make serious decisions.

*

*

*

*

1 m 1.uWep askedd totheMr.authors
Lloyd's replies to our questiw
of the resolution of the "Three"
:

if tbey agree that the General Assembly should instruct the
Atomi~Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to
prepare and submit to the Security Council by a definite date-wegnarned the date-February 1, 1952--a draft convention
envisaging the unconditionil prohibition of the atomic weapon
and the estabIishmmt of strict international control over the
implemenbtion of this prohibition.
Instead of replying to this question Lloyd declared that the
draft resoIution of the "Three" envisages that the commission
should draw up proposals for the draft treaty or treaties on
the given matter, as he expressed it, on the basis of the United
Nations plan, more correctly speaking, on the basis of the
Acheson-Baruch-tilienthalplan. But it is known that this
plan does not envisage prohibition of the atomic weapon, just
as it does not envisage strict international conkrol, of which
we spoke above.
Thus, by taking the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthd plan for a
basis, Woyd and his colleagues in the draft resolution of the
"Three" refuse to make provision for the prohibition of the
atomic weapon in the convention to l
x completed by February 1,
1952, Insisting that the Baruch plan for the atomic weapon be
taken as the basis, Mr. Lloyd in substance rejects our proposal, being fully aware that the Baruch pian is unacceptable
to us, and not only to us, but also to a number of other states; king
fully aware that the Baruch plan does not provide for the
probibition of the atomic wapon but postpones the settlement
of this question to some later stage; knowing well tbat on this
basis we cannot reach an agreement; also knowing we11 that
the so-called international control agency envisaged in the
Baruch plan has nothing in common with real international
control. For this reason we have the right to state that the
representatives of the three Powers, on whose behalf Mr.
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Lloyd spoke h e r d r e a t Britain, the United States and France
A v c given a negative answer to our second question.
2. In his reply to our third question Mr. Lloyd maintains
that the draft resolution of the "Three" goes farther than the
proposals envisaged in the Soviet amendment, which speak
of measures that ensure fulfillment of the decisions of the
General Assembly on the prohibition of the atomic weapon.
prohibition o f its manufacture, utilization solely for civilian
purposes of atom bombs aIready produced, and measures for
establishing control over the implementation of the convention.
Instcad of replying to our question Mr,Lloyd again refers
to the Baruch plan, presenting matters as though this plan
r e d y provides for prohibition of the manufacture of atomic
weapons and an effective international control. We have
already pointed out that neither one nor the other is provided
for in the Baruch phn.
As for placing d l atomic raw material and all facilities for
its production under the authority of the so-called international
contra1 agency, about which Mr. LIoyd spoke in his reply,
this proposaI, as already pointed out in the past, is utterly
unacceptable, &cruse all stocks of atomic raw material and
iIl plants for the production of atomic energy, as weU as
enterprises in allied industries-metallurgical, engineering,
electric power, chemical, and so on and so forth-are to be
placed under the authority of this so-called international:
agency or in its possession, which, essentidly speaking, is what
is intended. This would mean Nrniag over m the so-called
international control agency, which according to tbe schemes
of the supporters of the Baruch plan shovld in substance be
ad agency of the American manopoIists, all power over the
economic Iife of each country which has atomic raw material
and can produce atomic energy.
3. Replying to our fourth question, Lloyd said that the
three Powers agree that the General Assembly should recognize that any sincere plan for the substantial reduction of
armed forces and armaments must include the establishment

I .
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of an international control agency. He, however, has not
directly replied :a the question put by us, asserting that
whether the internatiana1 control agency is to be within the
framework of the Security Council or not would depend on
the terms of the agreement. He has explained that if the
phrase "within the framework of the Security Council" is
understood to mean that the 0perati~IIof the system of contra1
would be made fully dependent upon the so-called right of
"veto," this would beyond doubt be unaccepbble to the Governments of the three Powers.
Such a reply from Mr. Lloyd could only amuse extreme surprise. Indeed, Mr. Lloyd most likely k
s that in the resolution d the General Assembly of December 14, 1946, adopted at
the second part of the First Session of the General'AsdIy, i t
was decided that the international control agency would operate
within the fwneworh of tbe Secnrity Cogncii.
Was this decided or not? It was decided. Is this recorded any.
where? It is m r d e d . Is this recorded in the decisions of the
second part of the First Session of the General Assembly? It is
recorded in the minutes, and you can read it.
That is why Mr. Lloyd's remark as to whether this control
agency wifl be within the framework of the Security Council or
not proves hat the Governments of the United States, Great
Britain and Fmce do not wish to take into consideration the
decisions of the General Assembly for which they themselves
voted in the past and which carry their signatures, If this question is already settIed--and it is already settled-why than raise
this question? This can be done ody with one objective--to warn
ia advance that it will not be taken into consideration.
And this is already becoming a practice- There was, for
exampk, a gentlemen's agreement regarding the dections to the
Security Council, under which debite geographical areas nominated their candidates: the Latin American m~fltriegnominated
their candidate; countries of Eastern Europe, their candidate;
and now the American representatives are nominating Greece
instead of Byelomssia, and when they are reminded that thee was
such a geatIemen's agreement, they allege that it was concluded
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by another, as attempts to

evade giving a direct reply to the
question at i s s u e t of the general reduction of umaments."
We see that now, five 9later, the same attempts are bemg
repeated. I shall also calI to mind that at the Paris Session of
the General Assembly in 1948 I too had to refer to this matter
md to ddare that
the question of the s t z c d d 'veto' Is
altogether incorrectly interpreted in relation ta h e work of the
intemationd control agency. Of course the right of 'veto' h l o n g ~
to the security Guncir . .
"But this is a different matter and the poiat at issue hcrr is
that no one, at Ieast as far as the Soviet Union is concerned,
ever proposed nor does anyone now propose the appfication of
the right of t e t o ' in the work of the control agencies . .
. . We say clearly and explicitly: the internatiod conlrof
agency must not have the right of 'veto,' the Security Council
must have the 'veto' right. Therefore no one dares allege that
we waut to include the right of 'veto' in the internationd control

". . .

.

.

".

agency.

...

I,

In accordance with this priacipIed stand of the Soviet Union on
the "veto" question, at the Third Session in 1948 the Soviet
Union voted for the proposal submitted by the Polish delegation
which said "that it wiU not be necessarg that all the represenMiws
of the permanent member states of the Serurity Council vote
aEmnatively when the international control agency adopts decisions with regard to verification and inspection on its part."
This was a clear repIy to the question of the non-application
of the "veto" in the international control agwq. But through
the efforts of the delegations of the United States, Great Britain
and France this proposal, was rejected. Evidently their p h
excluded the adoption of a proposal fully clarifying the question
of the voting procedure in the international control agency and
underscoring the non-application in the fatter of the right of the
so-called "veto."
4. As to the question of whether the reprmtatives of the
United States, Great Britain and France agree that immediately
after the conclusion of the convention the international atomic
weapon control agency shouId inspect d the enterprises for
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the manufacture and storing of atomic weapns with rhe object
of verifying the implementation of the canvention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon-Mr. Lloyd made no reply to this
either. Instead of replying to this plain question, he preferred to
state that inspection is needed. But this is another question. This
is not what we asked; we asked whether they would agree to
inspeaion of a l l the p h t s for the mufacture and storing of the
atomic weapon immediateiy after the codusion of a conventim.
N o answer was given to this question,
Nor a n one ignore the fact that Mr. Lloyd particularly
stressed that inspection should k carried out in conformity with
successive stages. In other words, the inspection of atomic piants
wiil not be carried out immediately after the signing of the amvention if matters do not Peach the stage assigned to the atomic
weapon. Thus, it is dear from Mr. Lloyd's answer that the
United States, Great Britain and France do not agree with our
proposal for tbe immediate inspection of ah atomic plants as
soon as the convention we propose is signed.
5. lastly, it is necessary to turn to Mr. Lloyd's answer to our
first question: "Do the United States, Great Britain and France
agree that the General Assembly should declare the uneonditional prohibition of the atomic w e a p and the establishmeat
of strict international control over the impltmeotation of this
prohibition ?"
Mr. Lloyd, as we have heard, replied to this question by stating
that the adoption by the General Assembly of a t r i m draft
resolution would constitute a clear declaration in favor of the
unconditional prohi bition of the atomic weapon effected through
strict international control.
The draft resolution of the "Thee," which we all read and
whose text we all know well, does not contain any deckation
by the General AssembIy of the unconditional prohibition of the
atomic weapon and the establishment of strict intemational control
over the implementation of this prohibition. Therefore, referto a tripartite draft resolution whose adoption, accordtng to Lloyd,
would mnstitute a ddamtioa of tbe uncanditional prohibition
of the atomic weapon effected through strict internatiod con-
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t d b not correspond to what the draft resolution of the
"The" proposes.
I t is dear that this time, tm, Mr. Lloyd waded givmg a direct
answer to our question.
It is likewise dear that a dim3 answer to Our question is our
pro*
ta include in the draft resolution a point with the f d Iowing content:
"The General Assembly, recognizing the use of the atomic
weapon as P weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of
people to be contrary to the conscience and honor of the peoples
and incornprlde with mernkrship in the United Nations, dedares
the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weqmn and the
establishment of strict internationd contra1 over the implementation of this probibition.
"The h e r d Assnmbly instructs the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armm&b Commission to ptepare and submit by
February 1, 1952 for the consideration of the Securig Council a
draft coriventim envisa~ingmeasures that ensure fuhiUment of
the decisions of the GeneraI Assembly on the prohibition of the
atomic weapon, discontinuation of its praduction and h e utilitation solely far civilian p"poses of atom bombs d r d y produced
and on the estabiishment of stria international control over the
implementation of the above canvention."
1 stress what I have d d y said here, but I feel it necessary
to r e p t it because of the importance of this matter which concerns a weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of people.
Here is a dearcut, precise, unequivocal, absdutelp definite and
determined proposal for the genuine prohibition of the atomic
weapon in the name of the Generai Assembly,
Is it not evident that precisely this proposal is a perfectly dear
and definite proposal for thc uaconditional prohibition of the
atomic weapon, with all the ensuing consequences, and with the
simdtmeaus establishment of international control to ensure
the implementation of thia prohibition?

with regard to the repiies of
S spoke ow standbehalf
of the

Mr. Lloyd who
here on
three Powers and, comequently,
oux stand with regard to the replies of the Governments of the
United States, Great Britain and France.
It follows from the h v e that in its present form the threepower draft resolution does not pxovide the cond~rl~tls
ntrrsyary
for carrying out the task anfronting us-to prohibit the atomic
weapon and reduce armaments and armed form and to establish
striA international control. From the h e the mth the Soviet
Union proposes for carrying wt. this task is J& evident. This
path is h g h the & i o n of the above-mentioned serious
shortcomings from the draft resolution submitted by the Gavernm a t s of the United Stakes, Great Britain and France; this path is
through the idusion' of amendments in the draft that -wouId
ensure the successful xcomplishment of the i m p o m t task
rakd before the General Assembly of the prohibition of the
atomic w a p reduction of armaments and armed form and
establishment of strict international control.
The USSR delegation takes cognizance of the fact that the
situation which has arisen with regard to this question is characterized by considerable divergenes in tbe position of the Soviet
Union on the one hand, and that of the United States, Britain
and France on the other. We are willing, howwer, to continue
our efforts and to take part in the work of the p~posedsuhcommittee. The delegation of the Soviet Union is confident that
the ameadments it has submitted can faciIitatt the successful
accomplishment of the task confronting us for the good of the
peoples who yeam for world peace.
UCH
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Speech in the Political Committee
December 12, 1951
Mr. President, M a r s . Delegates:

I

N the opinion of the delegation of the USSR the work of the
Subcommittee has yielded certain positive results. It has

h d p d to establish precisely the stand of ehcb of the four detegations, to define more deatly their aspications and the aims they
have set themselves, and it IWS eliminated certain differences, dthough these are of relatively minor importance. Nevertheless.
the Soviet delegation holds tbat this is the strong aspea of the
Subcommittee'swork and that it would be incorrect not to mention
this positive side of the Subcommittee's work, just as it would
be q d y incorrect to overestimate the i m p o b c e of the work
accomp1ished by the Subcommittee, inasmuch as, in substance, unsolved differences remained dividing the USSR, on the one hand,
and the United States, Great Britain and Frmce, on the ather hand,
on very important questions whose solution is expected of us this may be said without fear of exaggeration - by the peoples oE
the entire world. H
erein lies the weak aspect of the work KCOMp1ishd by h e Subcommittee. But what the Subcommittee has
been unable to do must be done by the Committee of Twelve,
the Political Committee, the General A s d l y , the entire
United Nations.
Our paramount task consists preckdy in overcoming and
eliminating the differences on major questions and, in any me,
in raising these questions to their full stature, as merited by their
knport and signifiance. That is why the Soviet delegation deems
it necessa~to dwell precisely on these questions without wing
to cover everything that was under consideration by the Subcorn64

mitt% but believing itsdf h d to speak about thing3 of prime
importance.
I W start with Paragraph 2 of the memorandum dealing
with commm aims. The memorandum states that both the proposals-in question are the proposals outIincd in the draft mlution of the three Swes, the United States, Great Britain and
France, and the amendments of the Soviet delegatiwoincide
with regard to wlain common aims which they strive to attain.
As proof, the memorandum points out that the USSR delegation
has agreed to the b t paragraph of the preamble of the dmft
resolution of the "Thee," which says that the Gmeral Assembly
desires "to lift from the peoples of the world the burden of
increasing armaments and the fear of war, and to liberate new
energies and resources for positive programs of reconstmction
and development."
Subscribing to this formula, the Soviet Union has been fully
aware of its significance, has been fully aware of the respoasibiIity
placed on it by such an imporeant commitment as that indicated
h v ~ liftofrom the peoples of the world the b d m of increasing armaments and to liberate new energies and resources for p i tive work of reconstruction and development.
This is an important commitment. From this there must
inevitably follow corresponding conc1usions pertaining aIso
to the entire foreign policy of each s h k accepting this form&
The delegation of the USSR and - I am convinced of this the defegations of aLt countries sincerely assuming this commitment and m d y consistently and resoluteIy to implement it are
confronted with a n d e r of task which wodd facilitate the development of tbis noble aim set forth above and ensure the possibility of attaining it.
There can be no contradiction between this aim and the
metbods which would ensure its attainment. If contradiction
arises here, this can only mean that the methods prove to be
unsuitable for the attainment af the above aim and, consequentIy, other methods must k chosen.
assuming the commitment of lifting from the peoples of
the world the burden of increasing armaments and fear of war,
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it is stated in the fiat paragraph of the preamble of the M t
molution of the 'Thee," one must ask wesdf: Haw can this
b k be carried out--the task of lifting from the peoples the
burden of armaments. especially of increasing armaments? How
can one lift from the peoples the fear of war? How can one
liberate new energies and resources for the reconstruction and
development of countries? NahualIy it also follows &at by leaving thae qucsliom unanswered or by giving ambiguous or,
moreover, incorrect replies to these questions, matters cannot be
advanced even one miIlirneter.
as

But to give a c o r n answer to the above question one must look
xound oneself, see what is happening in the world, where armaments and tbe burdm rhv impose on peoples are growing more
and more. What is this mused by? What causes are g i o i rise
ta these phenomena? And what meam can and must be empIqed
for ehinating these phenomena?

We s h d not start now to present facts abundantly cited h e
earlier which 6 c i e n t l y wpIaia this question. W e consider it
necessay medy to tecaIl rhat the three Governments that submitted their draft resolution have at their disposal sbsolulely no
facts, no data, and consequently no grounds whatever thst could
justify the attempts they are making to deny that they and their
Atlantic bloc allies are engaged in their countries in a f m i e d
armaments drive and, mareover, on a constmtIy increasing scale.
Such a situation, of course, must inevitably p k e a heavy b d n
on the population of these countrits md so a n n o t f a d l i e the
easing of this burden to any degree. On the other hand, they do
not have any facts, any data whatever, and, because of this. no
grounds whatever, to present matters iu though such an amments
drive is under way in the Swiet Union and in the countries friendly
to it. Were it necessary again to refer to facts, many of them could
be cited, for wm during the time which has passed since the
kgirming of the Subcommittee's work and up to its conclusion
and resumption of the work by the First Committee, many n m
facts have accumulated which indisputably confirm the above
assertions.

I
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This d e s it asy to d d d e who can and who must b ~ a r
responshilitp for the situation that hiu arisen.
The first paragraph of the p r d l e is of great importance. T h e
&st d u s i o n which shwld be drawn from the statement it
contains is the duty of taking effective measures for stopping
the armaments drive, reducing armaments and armed f a c a ,
prohibiting the atomic weapon, and establishing international
contmI. Thereby the burden of armaments will be lifted from
the peoples of the world. Thereby the peoples of the world will
k rid of the danger or, as the preamble of the resolution of the
three States xeads, from the fear of war.
But are the three Governments which submitted the h
f
t of
their resolution oa this quation ready to carry this out in reality?
With the same sincerity with which we have hitherto replied to
tbis quwtioa in the Subcommittee,I must repeat this answer here
as well: No, they are not ready. Thcse three Powers are not m d y
to carry aut what they propose in the preamble, in the first
paragraph of this preamble of the draft resolution of tlle "Three."
This has been proved with special darity by the debates in the
Subcommittee and the efforts which have been exerted by the
representatives of the United States, Great Britain and Frmre
to wade the need for settling this problem in a positive way, I
am now coming to the differences on the most important probIems which the Submmittee has not sucaeeded in eliminating
for m o m indicated by us earlier, for w n s which I s h d try
to piesent later on.
The first and most important question of the entire present
problem is the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establisbment of an international control system. The Subcommittee
has devoted much time and attention to this question, analyzing
in detail the proposals of the Three and our proposals, but has
not reached any agreement.
Yesterday Mr. Lloyd made short shrift of this question very
easily by reducing the entire matter to one paint*
the question
of simultane~18lyprohibiting the atomic weapon and. establishing an intematid control agency. This, of course, is an important question, but when Mr.Lloyd, speaking on behalf of all
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three ddegations, said nothing eist in arplanation of the attitude
of these deIegations to this problem. he undoubtedly was not being
loyal to the principle of objectivity which he praised here so much
when discussing tbe Subcommittee's work.
In reality this question has not one but a great many important

"peas.
The Soviet Union demands and insists that the General
Assembly snake a decision declaring an unconditional ban on the
atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this ban and that a draft convention
be drawn up and submitted for the coasideration of the Security
CounciI by February I, f 952, providing for measures to ensure
the implementation of thii decision. This demand is contained
in the amendments to Paragraphs 2 and 3 of tbe preamble and
in Paragraph 3 of the amendments of the delegation of the USSR
proposed for inclusion in the draft resolution of the Three.
The Soviet Union proposes thar the AssembIy thus adopt two
resolutiwls simultaneously or, more mrrdy, make two derisions
in one res01ution: o-n
the ban of the atomic w e a p and
the establishment of an internatiwd control agency, another411
drafting a convention with practid measures for ensuring the
implementation of the decision of the General Assembly relating
to the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of
strict international controt Not limiting itself to this, the Soviet
Union demands that reduction of armaments and armed forces
begin immediateIy and proposes two measures.
First measure: a reduction of the armaments and armed forces
of the five P0wers-h United States, Great Britain, France,
China and the Soviet Union-by one-third within me year d
the adoption of the respective decision, and smnd measure:
convocation of a world conference of all states, both members
and non-members of the United Nations, to examine the question
of a substantial reduction of armed form and armaments and of
practical measures for the prohibition of the atomic weapon md
the establishment of international control over t!m enforcement
of such a prohibition.

Thus, according to the Soviet Union's proposal, three problems must be d e d ~ h ~ ~ J t d n e u ~ ( . r i y :
1. The unconditimal ban on the atomic weapon and the establishment of an hkmational control a m ;
2. A reduction of armaments and armed forces d all the f i e
Powers;
3. The convocation of r world conference for realizing the
sameaimsintheoaseofallotherPowers.
Tbat is why Mi. Lloyd was absolutely wrong yesterday in
deging that the Soviet Union separates the two problems the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of amaments and armed forces. The Swiet Union's amadments to
he threepower draft resolution point to the organic interconnection of these measures. In tbis case too Mr. Lloyd was not
objective in presenting the position of the Soviet Union on the
question of the redution of armaments.
The Governments of the United States, Great Britain aad
France do not agree to these propals. They object to these
proposds, seeing in than some kind of a trap set by the Soviet
unioa.
The Govemmenh of the United States, Great Britain and
France hold that in order not to land in this trap it is necessary
to postpone the prohibition of the atomic weapon until the
macbinerp of i n t e d o n d control is dabfished and pt into
aperation. They maintain that otherwise the entire matter will
k reduced to a mere promise to prohibit the aomic weapon
without any possibility of verifying whether this promise will
really be W e d .
This cansideration too m o t be regarded as convincing. A
decision of the General A d l y , esptcdlp if it is adopted
unanimously, annot be regarded as w o a h I w nor considered
an empty phrase; it cannot be said that it will be of ria s i g n 3 m
whatever. As for the *Let Union, we consider, and we dtdaie
this W y and dehitdy, that we will regard such r decision as
fully binding upon us even without any sanctim whatever which
would be provided for nomfulfjlIment of this decision against

those who will not want ta W or will try ta violate tbis
decision.
But let us accept for one minute the standpoint of the s ~ r s
of the draft resolution of the Three. Let us assume that dl will
yree that at b t it is necessary to set up, as this is pro@
by
the Govemmts of the United States, Great Britain and Prance,
an international control agency and put it into operation, and
only then will it be possible to implement the pmhbition of the
a m m c weapon with all the consequenw foUowing thdm.
W e shaft nur stop to refall that from the standpoint of the Soviet
Union such a decision would be absduteiy incorrect bemuse it
could not lead to the desired objective. But if the Genera1
Assembly were to act precisely as the United States, Great Britain
and France insist, in that case the question would inevitably arise
-what system of international control: exactly do the Governm a t s of the three States-the United States, Great Britain and
France-propose ? What system of international control exactly
do they consider necessary to establish and put into operation in
order to ensure prohibition of the atomic weapon, as they say?
We know what answer ran be given, will be given and is
already given to this qustion. We know that this is the Baruch
plan which is being advertised us a plan of'the United Nations
and from which all three Governments - the United States,
Great Britain and France - do not want to retreat a single
step. True, they state that thq are ready to ex&
m y other
plan if it will be better than the Baruch plan. But right there
and then they add that there is no better plan and that. they do
not want to take one step from the so-called h u s h p h .
W
t do not agree to this. The shortcomings of this plan have
been proved sufficiently and are admitted wen by hose who in
the past were ready to defend tbis plan tooth and nail. Fox
example, tbe Time.r, in the artide "Disarmament" of December
I, 1951, pint& to the unsubstantiated merits of this plan, calling thii plan utopian and not concealing such an important
fact as that in practice it would h just as difficult far the
United State to accept this plan as for the Soviet Union. In
practice, the Times said, it would k just as difficult for the
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United States to accept this utopian propal as for the Soviet
Union. D c a this not contain a devastating appraisal of the
pradicabilitg of these proposals or, to be more exact, does this
not prove that these p+s
are devoid of any practical significance? In such a case, however, a legitimate question arises:
What grounds are there for the Governments of the United
States, Great Britain and France to continue to support the
Much plaa if even the Time3 considers that this plan has no merit
whatmer and hat it is utopian, unacceptable in practice even for
the sponsor of this plan - the United States itself?
Speaking of the Baruch plan, one must m m m k r &o some of
its specific features as, for example, the notorious system of
stages created especially to prestrve for the United States under
all conditions, and even after the establishment of an international
control agency and its going into operation, and after the s o - d e d
prohibition of the atomic weapon, advantages in the manufacture
of the atomic weapon which ia the opinion of the United States
it has. Why, the meaniag of this system of stages consists in not
disclosing one's secret and in preventing the prohibition of pmduction of the atomic weapon immediately after the signing of
the convention or adoption of the decision on the prohibition of
the atomic weapon in some other way, and in postponing this
matter until the later, until the latest stage, and, it s h d d be
assumed, until the verg last stage, until the time that will never
come.
Only naive people may not be able to see though the w t h
crafty mechanism of this system of stages, a system of sodled
progressive "disclosure and verification," of which the Government
of the United States, Great Britain and France tirelessly speak,
not wishing. however, d I y to "disdose" and "verify" the most
important and most dangerous weapon of mass destruction of
the people.
The soIe argument which, essentially speaking, the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France put forth
against the immediate prohibition of the atomic weapn boils
down to the fear that some state will take the patb of violating
such a decision, will not carry out this decision, and that other
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partaers acting in g o d faith will h d themselves in a position
disadvantageous and unfavorable for them. Fear, however, is a
poor munsel. It is a p r counsd in usual, eveqday affairs ; it
is a still worse counsel in political affairs. Fear befogs the mind
and impels those subjected to it to a false path and dictates wrong
actions.
Nevertheless, we are told that it is impossible to takc someWfs ward. The Soviet Union, however, dws not propow that
anyom take somebody's word and is not itself inched to take
somebody's word. That is why the Soviet Unim considers it
necessarg to esdIish strict, effective international control. International control according ta the idea of the Swiet Union, must
M y be international and not the kind that is being presented
by the sponsors of the Baruch plan, whose views Baruch frankly
qressed stating that the personnel of this agenq should be,
so far as possible, internationd. So far as possible !
In order somehow to get out of the diffffulty arising in view
of the refusat to agree to the immehate unconditional prohibition
of the atomic weapon, at least in priociple, it is suggested that
this cannot be dowed d l international cone01 is established
and put into operation.
Mr. Lloyd said that the Soviet Union holds that here must be
a certain period between the prohibition of the atomic weapon and
h e establishment of international control. Yes, indeed, there
must be sucb a period and it must inevitably be in the very nature
of things. And this bas k e n admitted also by the sponsors of
the Baruch plan themselves. At least in his s p e d of Jme 1%
1946, Baruch, speakiag of the so-mIIed stages of development,
said that, "once a charter for the Authoxitp has been adopted, the
Autboritg and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fulIy organized and effective." He
a h said that only after the system of c o n t d over atwnic energy
was d y implemented would the manufacture of the atom bomb
be stopped.
Five years have already p s e d since &en, however, and hope
for the possibility of establishing a system of intematiomf control on the basis of the Baruch plan bas vanished, There are no
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grounds for m@ng that the situation in tbIs respert can change,
all the less so since, as we have m above, the Baruch plm b
increasingly l&g its supporters and adherents. But even five
y w ago it was impossibh to agree to the solution of the problem
of the atomic weapon propwed by the Baruch plan, which was
mergetidy condemned and resded by a number of states. But
let us assume that on a certain day and hour a convention on the
prohibition of the atomic w a p n and on the establishment of internathid control is signed md ratified. In such a case it I m m d ateIy comes into force and cotquent~ythe prohibition d the
atomic weapon must
come into force, and thus it becomes
a fact with all the resulting legal consequences, not to speak of
the moral and political mnsequaces.
What are these consequences?
The most important of them is the commitmenl of all s t a h
which ratified this convention to discontinue immediately the
manufacture and, wm more impomt, the utilization of the
atomic wpm; M use immediately the already produced atom
h m h exdusivcly for chitian p u r p e s . Here are two consequeace~
which follow from the very fact of the signing, ratihtion and
coming into force, according to all international rules and internatiod practice, of tbis convention oa the prohibition of the
atomic weapon and on the establishmeat of international control. But if we take the standpoint of the s p o m ~ sof the dmft
resolution, this convmtian, notwithstanding the fact that it has
been ratified and has become effective, w 9 still not be operating
because it is necessary to wait until the machioe7 of an &mationd contd agency is set up, until the oeceswry personnel is
selected and until this entire machinery is set into motion. But
wilt it be set into motion, and when exactly? There is d m c e on
this point. Yet without any guarantee that this machinery will
r d y be set into motion in the stipdated time, the entire anvention with its prohibition of the atomic weapon IXCOIII~S
suspended in mid-at.
We have aheady drawn attention to the fact that the so-called
international control agency pIaaaed by Acheson-Baruch-Lilimthal
must in substance be an American atomic supxtmst and that it
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would carry out a line corresponding to the policy of the Un~rcd
States, and not even to the policy of Great Britain, w h i 4 according to the authoritative statement of the Prime Minister of Great
Britain. is now the chief atomic base of the United States of
America, and even less to the policy of France, but corresponding
only to the policy of the United States of America, wbich cannot allow any other situation without running the risk of I&g
the main lever af command in the entire sphere of atomic energy,
We remember that objective p p l e . nat interested in utilizing
the international control agen& f i r their o m purposes, when
analyzing the Baruch plan unanimousIy arrived at the conclusion
that the Baruch plan in general aims to freeze or block the entire
question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon,
Confirmation of such a conclusion can be found in Mr.
Acbeson's letter of 1946 accompanying the report on international
control over atomic mergy which directfy states, as I have already
pointed out, that the Baruch plan must not be interpreted as a
commitment to prohibit the atomic weapon immediately after this
plan is put into operation, and that, although such a necessity
might subsequently arise, a decision, no matter when it is made,
will be bound up with considerations of highest policy affecting
the security of the United States and must be made by the Government of the United States in accordance with its constitutional
processes and ia the light of dl the facts of the world situation.
What does this mean? This means that if tbe Baruch pIan
were adopted, if the Baruch pIan envisaging an intematikal
control agency in accordance with the scheme it proposes were
implemented, prohibition of the atomic weapon by the United
States might not follow. 'inother words, the United Srates might
not declare the prohibition of the atomic weapon even after in&national mntmi is put into operation, if the interests of the
United Stat=, if the so-called highest interests of its poliq, do
not require this, or require a directly opposite decision.
What sense is there in making such a proposal with the reservations that are contained in such official dmments as the letter of
Achesan to the United States Secretary of State Byrncs, in the
phrase which I have just quoted and which bas not-beenrefuted

sense is there in assuring us that
or corrected by Acheson?
the proposal of the Swiet Union is illusory and not real, the proposal to ban the atomic weapon and instruct the Committee of
Twelve to draw up a convention envisaging in it both inkmational control and pr&
measures for the do-t
of this
prohibition, and that, on the coatrarp, b
t to set up i n t e r n a t i d
control is real? This plan must lx based on the Baruch p h .
This plan, if it is adopted, will say everyding except one thing,
namely, except that as soon as this plan or this convention enters
into force the atomic w a p n will k immediatdy prohibited. This
w i I I not be said in the &mican pian!
In the &id document ttus whole question is made dependent
upon considerations of highest policy affecting the security of the
United SW, is made dependent upon the constitutional procedure
of the United States and on the international situation, in the
light of which, according to the Achcsw m m d u m , this
question should be 'settled.
But is it not deax tha&this formula conceafs reservatiwrs wbich
can, wen afkr a contd agency is established and put into operation, direct the &for&of this control a p c p along chmcIs which
wilI most easily yield to certain pressure? These teservations will
give the United States the passibiLiQ of pmtecting itself from any
control on the part of this wcalltd international control agenq
by r e f m c a to considerations of the "highest policy" and "facts
of the world situation."
We p r o p a dear-cut and simple solution40 ban the atomic
wapon.
W h has this atomic weapon now! The United States oE America and the USSR.
W e say openly and firmly: "Ban the atomic weapn," and we
assume the obligation of carrying this out.
We are told: "NO,
we canna take your word foi it, a c q t our
plan-the Baruch plan." But they tell us this only because thy
know that the Baruch plan they propose will never I d to the
prohibition of the atomic weapn. They say this only to gain time
in order to keep on stockpiling this horrible weapon more and
more!

We ate presented with a mythical plan, tbe prestige of which
has been undermined even among those who formedy ardently
supported it-take for example the Tjrne~.And is it only the
Times?

That is why we can say that the pramtation of the question of
prohibition of the atomic weapon as it is done in the drafi
iesolution of the "Thee'-whereby the entire prohibition of the
atomic weapon is made dependent upon the establishment of an
intamatid control ageacp, and then the setting into motion of
this international agencg itself is made dependent on "highest
poliq" and an the facts "in the light of the world situation"-is a
bluff which can produce nothing but deception of the peoples.
But you state that you do not wane deception. h
t us then turn
these aspirations into tangible, flesh-and-blood deeds that will
really show the peoples the truth and make them calm, free them
from t h fear that they, their ttumes, and their children will be
destroyed, free them from the fear of war, k, is said in the first
paragraph of the preamble.
We say that it is incorrect to present the question of the pmhibition of the atomic weapon and control as it is done in the
draft rmIution of the United W, Great Britain and France.
Oa the one hand prohibition of the atomic weapon is made
dependent upon the establishment of an international control
agenq; on the other hand a plan for the establishment of this
agency is proposed which:
1. Has already c d e d forth serious objections and a negative
appraisal on the part of a number af states, as well as institutions
and specialists in this sphere in the United States, Great Britain
and in 0 t h countria ;
2. Has already been rejected by a numkr of states which do
not agree to this plan and insist on n p h which would realiy
ensure the establishment of an international conha1 agency and
the observance of elementary standards of international law,
guaranteeing respect for state sovereignty.
Thus the proposal to make the prohibition of the atomic
weapon d e p d e n t upon the establishment of an international
contmI agencg, which in turn is made depndent upon the adop76
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tion of the Baruch plan, which in turn is made dependent u p
highest policy and all kinds of other reretvations, creates a vicious
axle, in the full sense of the ward, from which there is no way
out.
But a way out must be found. And this way out may consist
in the General Assembly's dedaring immediately the unconditional
ban on the atomic weapon and establishment of an international
control agenq and instructing the Committee of Twelve, which
we have agreed to establish in the Subcommittee instead of the
two formerly existing commissions, to prepare a convention providing for measures ensuring tbe implementation of this prohibition. The refusal to adopt such a proposal represents nothing
else but refusal to get out from the impasse which is W c i a l l p
being mated or has already been created, an impasse which has
continued for five years now and to whi& it is high time to
put an end.
To our direct question as to wh&r the sponsors of the resolution of the "Three" agree tbat the General Assembly declare
an unconditional ban on the atomic weapon and the establishment of stria international controI over the enfoirement of this
ban, Mr.Lloyd has not given an answer, preferring to get along
with a hazp phrase that the "adoption of r tripartite draft resolution by the General AsscmbIy would already be a dedaxatim in
favor of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons enforced by strict international control."
The work of the Subcommittee has shown that this hazy
phrase mnceaIs in reality a rejection of the proposal on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. Nevertheless the work of the
Subcommittee has been useful because it has helped to rwed the
thaughts which Mr. Lloyd has tried to cover up by diplomatic
phrases.
It is necessarg to face the truth and take facts as they are. And
the facts are such that even if h e proposal for the prohibition of
the atomic weapon and detailed regulations on intematimd
control i r e included in one and the same mnventioh, internatid
control woutd not kgin operating simultaneously with the signing of the convention but after the l a p of a certain time necessary
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for carrying out a whole system of intricate organizational
measures without which this control agency cannot operate. Those
who are not interested in the prohibition of the atomic weapon
are prepared to grasp at thls circumstance, xooted in the very
nature d tbings, in order to delay the discontinuation of the
manufacture of the atomic Weapon, to delay the ban against the
utilization of the atomic weapon, to delay all this u t i I the mntroI
machinery begins to function, although there is no indimtion
anywhere of the provision to ensure that it will ever begin to
function in genera1 with things the way they are in this matter.
W e are told that our proposal me-: fust prohibition, and then
control:.This is untrue because we say--the decisions to ban the
atomic weapon and establish international coatroi must be made
sirnuitaneously and from them must follow a l l the consequences
arisiag from the mmaI and political obligation such decisions
impose. It is precisely the pr~posatcontained in the draft solution of the "Three," however, that amount to a refusal to pmbibit the atomic weapon until the system of international control
begins to operate. This means that even after the rspective states
agree on the need to ban the atomic weapon and to establish
international control, they may i e o t e such an agreement and
continue to manufacture atomic weapons and even to utilize them
in carrying out their military pkns and, even more, in the military
actions they are conducting against other psopfcs.
It should be added to the above that there is absolutely no
logic in the argument that a decision to prohibit the atomic
weapon before the internationa1 control agency starts functioning
will create a loophde and will maice a fiction and a fraud of
probibition of the atomic weapon. Such a fraud, however, would
certainly be m p e d and would certainly cover with eternal shame
the state which resorted to such perfidy.
There is another circumstance that must k noted here, namely,
that even with no convention in existence prohibiting the use of
the atomic weapon, the atomic weapon is not being used in the
military d o n s unleashed in various p k e s by the policy of a
State which possesses the atomic weapon, dthough there are some
madmen who are inciting to its use at present. If not moral con78
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siderations, then apparently considerations of common sense,
caution 8nd fear that use of the atomic weapon may cause irreparable consequences restrain the people indined to risky ventures from taking such a step.
There is dready an example of how certain considerations,
moral, poIitical and others, I would say business considerations,
prevent& the use of poison gam against the enemy, as the
Second World War showed, even by those not legally bound by
the Hague Convention.
Why is all this forgotten now when the prohibition of the
atomic weapon is being discussed? Why is such fierce resistance
being offered now to the General Assembly's discharging its
noble duty by declaring the prohibition of the atomic weapon
and the establishment of international control, on the pretext that
such decisions of the General Assembly might be utitiwd by
unscrupulous governments for perfidious ends? There are no
grounds for this whatmer.
The attempt made yesterday b y . B r i W s ddegate to represent
the plan of the Soviet delegation as a plan providing for stages
is absolutely fruitless. He enumerated three such stages.
Lloyd objected to this plan prtxisely because it envisagd some
kind of stages. Why then does he agree to these very same stages
in the plan outlined in the tripartite draft resolution? This is
d i h l t to explain by generally accepted laws of Iogic. But the
point is that our plan does not envisage any stages, and this is
easy to understand if account is taken of the fact that the essence
of the system of stages is not in the transition fmm one position
to another, which is perfectly natural bemuse it is impossible to
solve tasks immediately and simultaneausly; the pint is that the
unacceptability of the system of s t a g s stems from the fact that
this transition from one position to another is made d e p d e n t
upon various preliminary conditions which give wide scope for
arbitrary action by the agencies put in charge of tbis math.
Thus, in the sphere of prohibition of the atomic weapon, transition from the stage of mntrd aver raw materials to the stage of
control over the production of the atomic weapon, according to the
Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthalplan, is made dependent upon a m m 79

ber of conditions, the apptaiwl of which is @aced f ullp withh the
competence of the leadlag agency. Thus the transition from one
stage to amber, according to the ~ a r & plan, is not a n a h d . unhindered transition from one stage to mother or from one action
to another, but is d e dependent upon the discretion and ubitrarg will of those in h g e of the given matter.
It is ridiculous to speak of s h e when all that is meant is
the performance of one task or another in a necessary sequence
determined by physical and makerial aspects of the matter. Arguing, as Mr. LIoyd did yesterday, h u t stages, one could say, for
example, that breakfast consists of a n&r
of stages, and one
could count quite a number of such stages, beginning with the
setting of the table and ending with the last nwrse.
All the above-mentioned considerations seem to us &dent
to eliminate aU doubt not only concerning the €act h t there
are differences of opinion between the USSR, on the one h d , md
the United States, Great Britain and France, on the other, with
regard to methods and the attainment of common a h , as the
memorandum says, but dso that these so-called "common aims"
are far from common and far from identical. One should have
a clear understanding of the situation that has arisen. More
work is necessary, much more, to make these "common aims"
reaUy common and really identical.
W e have not lost hope that this can h accomplished in the
course of wr further persttent and patient work.
In support of our proposal that the General Assembly prodaim the uncmditiond prohibition of the atomic weapoa and &
establishment of international control, we indiated tbe special
m o d and plitical significance such a decision of the General
Assembly would have. We must lay stress on this now too. Such
a decision of the General Assembly will not be a scrap of paper,
as some peopIe think, nor an empty phrase, nor a fraud. It caa
be neither the one, nor the other, nor the third, kame it accords
with the ianemmt aspirations of millions of p p l e and objectively can, must, and will serve to eliminate, or at Ieast to lessen,
international tension; it wiU serve the cause of peace, will be
directed against warmongers and the policy of war adventures.
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reduction of armaments and armed forces. The
substance of the proposal of the USSR is that the five Powemthe United States. Great Britain, France, China and the USSRreduce dl their armed forces and armaments by one-third in the
course of one yar. This proposal also meets with objection on
the part of the above three Powers. Yet it s h d d be said that in
this mse, too, we cannot recognize the arguments adduced to
support this objection as in the Ieast satisfactoty.
Indeed, we are told that such a reduction cannot be regarded
as a reduction contributing to peace if it is not known what a m d
might the Great Powers are reducing and to what Ievel they intend to bring such a reduction. As for t h level, we have a l d y
spoken h u t tbis in sufficientdetail. T h e most essential point of
this matter may be recalled in brief. This is that, so far, the
initialor5 of the propod regarding the lwel have not been able
to say anything coherent about the principles which should determine this level. The attempt made here by Mr.Acheson on a
pmious don,
as X explained last time, cannot be regarded
as at all satisfactoy, Taking the size of the country's territory and
population as a basis, Mr. Achesw held that it is this that should
serve m a criterion for defining the Ievel. The bigger the country,
the larger the population, the more armaments and armed
forces the state should have. Mr. Acheson added, however, that
nevertheIess some kind of limit, some kind of ceiling, should
be fmed beyond which this h e 1 must not rise. Tbis means,
however, tbat if tbe prinaple set forth by Mr. Acheson as a
criterion and the level, of which the United States' representative
spoke Iast time, are applied, the quantity of armaments and the
numerical strength of the amed forces will correspond neither
to the size of the country nor to the size of the population. What
then, one n a t u d y asks, remains of this so-called Iwel? Besides,
if one is to proceed from the so-called level, and this has already
been confirmed by the representatives of France, Great Britain
and the United States st the Conference of the four Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris, the entire question may, in the final andv-
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sis, result not in a reduction but in an increase of armaments. What
then, one naturally asks, is the value of this level and this entire
undertaking concerning the so-called duction of armed forces
if no duction of armed forces w h t e v r may result?
T h e second question raised by the representative of Great
Britain pe&
to the need to know the site of the armed forces
and mameats of each country. We also s&ciently explained this
question when we pointed out that if the reduction proposed
by the Soviet Union is agreed to, all the e r e s on m
e
d forces
and armaments will be kid on the table at once. This is also
evident fmm Paragraph 7 of the amendments of the USSR,
which deciares that ail the stakes submit forthwith to the inter.
national control agencp, and, in my case, not later than one
month after the acceptance by the General Assembly of decisions
for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of
armaments and armed forces, complete information regarding the
state of their armed forces and all types of armaments, including
the atomic wapm, at the time of acceptance d the said decisions.
If the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and
France are really interested in exact information about the armaments and armed forces of &the USSR,here is a direct way to obtain
it. In that case Mr. LIoyd, as well as the representatives of the
h e r two Powers in whose name Mr.Uoyd spoke, will. have no
need of using information which he himself said here was not
quite accurate or, as I would say, is altogether inaccurate.
What thrn in such a case is left of the objections to the Soviet
proposal for a reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed
foms of the five Great Powers? Nothing, except perhaps the
objection that such a reduction will not create a 'Wmce of
power" and will leave intact the Soviet Union's aIleged miIitary
superiority. But if Woyd is using inaccwatc information about
the annamms and armed f o r m of the Soviet Union. as he himd f has a d m i d , then how can he talk about the military
superiority of the USSR which, of course, is determined by data
b u t armaments and armed form, and without which data it
is impossible to estimate the military power of any state?
From the speeches of the representatives of the United States,
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Great Britain and France, it is clear that the theory of thc sod e d balance of power underlies their position on this isue.
But h i s theory has never served the cause of peace. Even more,
it has never pet been possible to achieve the so-called balance of

per.
It is known, for example, that the so-called balance of power
in the R r East as provided for at the Washington Conference
of 1923-22 on navd limitation was a model of absdute insdility in the very fields in which the attempt was made to achieve
a balance and stability of the situation. In reality the Wahington
agreement not ody did not ensure a "balance of power" in the *
Far East but consolidated Japan's undivided domination in Southem Manchuria and gave Japan important strategic guarantees ia
case of war, which guarantm J a p did not fail to use in the
Second World War, turning upside down, in the graphic words
of the head of the Swiet Government, J. V. Stslin, the entire
system of the postwar peace regime.
This brings to mind the rather witty guestion asked by a
British p l j t i d leader as to how the requirements of a navd
Power like Great Britain can be balanced with the requirements
of a land Power like the Soviet Union. How can infantry divisions,
this question asked, be measured against a m bombs or heavy
b m k r squadrons; how can jet planes be compared with piston
engine pIanes, or modern submarines with prewar submarines?
Yet, ignoring dl the lessons of histoy, df the facts of the
very recent past, ignoring the lessons of the Second WorId War
unleashtd by Hderite Germany, miIitarist Japan and fascist
Italy, but, m the other hand, reverently remembering the practice
of the League of Nations, harmful to the cause of peace, an
attempt is now being made to turn the United Nations organization onto a path, already known for its disastrous consequences, of
skmgthening peace by the so-called "bahce of power."
The Soviet Union will not move along this path. The Soviet
Union also urges the United Nations not to take this path if it
does not intend sharing thc sadly remembered fate d the League
of Nations.

*

*

*

out that evidently all agree to the
conference of all the stam on
armaments reduction, but that in this matter there are essential
differences with regard to the method and time for the convocation of the conference. This is true, for &re are such differ-,
do~hraately.But these differences go much further than just

points
Tidtamemorandum
of conroking n world
HE

method and time.
Taking the matter of convoking a world conference seriously,
the Soviet Union recommends that the General Assembly adopt
a corresponding decision in perfectly dear and unequivocal terms.
The merhod of convoking such a mnference--this is a decision
of the G e n e d Assembly containing an appcal to the gouemmats of dl the states, btb members of the United Nations
and states at present not members of the United Nations.
Tim-ot
later tbm June 1, 1952.
The prepitration of the world conference-recommendations
that the Security Council prepare and submit, within three months,
practical propats for the implementation of the entire decidon
of the General Assembly, the draft of which we are discussing
and, consequently, of that part of the decision which concern
the conpbmtion of the world coderenee.
It seems clear that every sincere supporter of the -Id
conference should without reservation uphold those proposals, However the three Governmen&the United States. Great Britain
and France-propose a different method. They limit themsefvs
merely to the statement on behalf of the General Assembly that
such a conference should be convoked, without indicating the
dare, even approximately, for the convocation of such a conference.
They limit themselves to indicating that this conference should be
called wbea the work of the Committee of Twelve is at a stage
when, in that Committee's opinion, some part of its program is
ready for submission to the Governments and, consequently, the
conferente may be called. Thus, in this case too, the whole matter
boils down to mere desires unconned with practicaI measures of
any sort and is, therefore, of very little signifimce, if not to
say of no significance at aU.
A comparimn of these two proposals is sufficient
reveal
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dearly the entire diffcmc between than and to leave no d d t
that in d i t p the three Governments arc not at all concerned
about the c o n v d o n of a WOCMconference on mameats reduction nor, therefor^ ithut a r ~actual reduction of armaments
and armed forces within s short a time as possible. Yet this is
precisely what the interests of peace demand, the interests of all
peace-loping peoples.
I b v e dwelt in &dent detail-regretfulIy in more detail
than I would haw w i s h e d 4 n only the most important quedons
causing differences
the USSR, on the one band, and ttre
three Powers, on the other. 1 did this only to show how i m p o m
these differences are, differences determined by the picp of the
Soviet Union, on the one hand, and by the poiicy of the three
Powers--the United States, Great Britain and France--w tbe
o h r , in the given matter, i,s., in the matter af prohibition of the
atomic weapon, establishment of international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
The eliminatim of these differences is of tremendous significance ia the important matter of removing the tension in
inkmatiom1 relations, in the matter of improving these relations.
Ln the S u b e o m m i ~we arrived at certain important decisions.
Even what are d e d hem and referred to irr the memorandum
as minor decisions, despite the fact that they are minor, are of
great imprtaate. Every step which climinatn differences betareen
US, let them he in minor matters st present, gives us hope that
the nwtt step may eliminate dif fexmta in more important matters.
And we are striving for this, we want this, we are working for
tbis.
Certain important decisions were readred in the Subcommittee,
in partidar decisions on uniting the ~6mmissions,on the c o m p
sition of the joint committee, on its membersfiip, and procedure
of work; the question of voting arid of the "veto" have been
clarified. An agreement was achieved on d these questions. X
believe that my neighbon on the right will confirm this.
It is hardly necessary to stress how irnprtmt all this is to the
cause of peace, to the welfare of the peoples who are demanding
of the United Nations organization that it take active and decisive
85
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measure to terminate the frantic armaments drive which is
tightening the noose aronnd the neck of h e states folWmg
this path, the armaments drive which is swallowing huge resources
and energies for the preparation of a new wodd war, resources
and energies which could be used to improve the m m i c p s i tim of the popuhtion suffering from the armaments drive and
weighed down by the burden of war budgets in the States of
the Atlantic camp.
The United Nations organhhn is faced with a tremendous
task-&
task of uncondifionally prohibiting the atomic weapon,
of reducing m a m e n & and armed forces and atablishing strict
international cmtrol. We must continue this work, the work in
tbis direction, and utilize every opportunity which arises to accomplish the above-mentioned task in the interests of strengthening peace, in the interests d dl peace-loving peoples.

Speech in the Political Committee

December 18, 1951
URINGthe past

few days the attention of the First Committee
has h e n nmcentrard on the so-ralIed revised draft resolution of the "Three"
the United Skates, G m t Britain, and
France
and the amendments to it submitted by the delegation of the USSR.
The representatives of certain delegations, first and foremost
the authors of the altered draft resolution, have spent no little
effort trying to convince us t h t the changes which have been
introduced in this draft d l y entitle it ta be legarcled as an
altered draft, as a revised draft, when compared with the original draft of the same three Powers - the United States, Great
Brihin lad France submitted by them as early as November
19.
Careful d ' n a t i o a of the revised draft resoIution, however, does not reveal m y reaIIy serious changes in it. True, individual minor corrections have been introduced in this draft,
but in substance this so-dled revised draft does not differ
from the previous one. This draft, like the original one, constitutes an attempt to substitute for the question on reduction
of armaments and armed forces, prohibition of atomic weapons
and establishment of inteinational control, the proposal to collect information on armaments and armed forces, and essentially it goes no further than that. As before, this draft retains
the objective of frustrating the reduction of armaments and
the prohibition of atomic weapons.
Therefore, one must be very careful in accepting the statemen&. made here by the authors of this draft, primarily by Mr.

D
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Jessup, that the United States strives to find a practical solution
which would lead to certain, as he said, agreed results in order
to reIieve international tension, and that the proposals put forward by the United States allegedly constitute the key to a
future decision, opening a wide road along which it is possible
to advance, striving for the solution of the unsettled problems
and the lessening of friction and disagreements. If on the given
question the Government of the United States had really been
guided by such aspirations, there wodd be no necessity to resort to such hay and indefinite formulations as those running
through the revised draft resoIution of the "Three," which in
this respect does not in the least differ from the original draft
of this resolution, This is most obvious, for instance, from
an analysis of Paragraph 3 of the revised draft resolution of
the "Three," whose entire difference from the original text of
this paragraph of the draft resolution consists in the rephrasing of some of the provisions and in a more subtle formulation
of others, which sem no less to mask the red purpose of this
paragraph wbich actually reduces itself to the defense of that
very same Baruch pIan at all costs.
In this so-called revised draft resolution of the "Three"
evergtbing finally boih down to several changes of secondary
importance which have the objective of diverting attention
from the basic Iine of the United States, Great Britain and
France, which aims to hold firmly to the fundamental conceptions of which Messrs. Jessup, Lloyd and Mmh have spoken
here, having in mind that very same Baruch phn.
All the latest statements of Mr. Jessup, echoed by Messrs.
Uoyd, Moch and several other delegates. for example the representatives of Bolivia and Peru, to the effect that the United States
allegdy tries to achieve an interna6onal system which would
mure the reduction of alI armed forces and all types of armaments, ate completely contradicted by the many facts that permeate the entire practice and policy of the United States of
America and certain other states limping in its w*.
Despite the fact that this is the second month that the United
Nations has been extensiveIy discussing the questions of prohi88
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bition of atomic weapons, establishment of international con-

trol and reduction of amamen& md armed forces, and that the
United States, Great Britain and France declare their wifingn e s to take the necessary measures in this sphere these states
are limiting themselves to mere declarations, which, in addition, are attended by serious resistance to any attempt to put
these dechmtiws into any sort of definite form, evea remotely
resembling a decision of the General AssembIy. And at the
same time in these countries, under the leadership of their
governments, ceaseless work is under way, assuming ever greater proportions, to increase further the amammts and umcd
forces of these countries, constantly to produce and perfect new
types of weapons of aggression and mass destruction of people,
suchasatamic~p.
The last semi-annual 1951 report of the United States Sccretarp of Defense to the President of the United States insists on
the further expansion of the American &Iitarp program, and
calls upon the American people to make further srcrifrces so
that this military program can be successfully fulfilled.
In bis report, the United States Secretary of Defense s p d s
of the most gratifying, as he puts it, successes attained in the
developmept of different tgpes of atomic weapons and the researches in creating thermo-nuclear armaments, not to speak of
planes, 'naval vessels, tanks, and so on and so forth.
Mr.h v e t t , the United States Secretary of Defense, literally
goes into raptures over the growth of armaments in the United
States on the basis of the American military budget of 60 billion dollars.
Notwithstanding the warning voices already sounding here
and there about the danger of the approaching crisis of overproduction, the expansion of war industry at the expense of
civilian industry is proceeding full b h t , with the volume of
war production in the United States at present, as is known,
amounting at Ieast to two billion dollars monthly, which is
three times above the level of the k t month of 1950.
Notwithstanding the fact that the policy of an armaments
drive and the preparation for another war is incrmingly un-
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dermining the economies of the countries which have chosen((
such a path in their domestic and foreign policy, a poky disastrous for the economies of these countries, this line is still being
mried out, inspired, on the one band, by such organharions
of employers as the National Association of Manufacturers in
the United States and West European countries, which are
raking in profits on the war and war preparations, and, on the
other hand, by the leaders of the foreign policy of these countries, which have united in the aggressive Atlantic bloc.
In this connection one must mention the recent statement of
Foster, spokesman of the United States Defense Department,
wbo called for tbe acceleration of the production of armaments
both in the United States and in the countries of W ~ e m
Europe allied with it, and who warned of the various dangers
which the world, according to him, allegedly faces.
"We must," Foster said, "clearly understand that next year
might be the most dangerous in the history of the West. If we
accustom oursdves to this idea," he continued, "and act accordingly, we will be fully able to accomplish what we are urged to
accomplish by General Eiwnhower and many other leaders of
the North Atlantic Alliance and carry out our program of rearmament." la atha words, of the armamenfs drive.
That is why the United States Government and the Governmdats of Great Britain and France, okdiently following it, do
not really take measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons
and the reduction of armaments and armed forces. To adopt
such proposaIs aid to begin realiy to carry t h m out by no
means tallies with the entire trend of the present foreign policy
af the United States, which is stubbornly steering a course of
cmplicsting international reIations and preparing another
world war.
Under sucb urcumshnces is it feasible to assume that the
ruling circles of the United States
as well as those of Great
Britan and Fiance, supparting them in this matter - can really seriously strive for a reduction of armaments and armed
forces and for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control?
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That is why w e venture to say in reply to the question put to
us above that it is precisely here that one must look for an explanation of that resolute resistance wbich is being offered by
the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and
France to the adoption of the proposals of the Soviet Union and
of the amendments in which these proposaIs are formulated
and which are designed for real prohibition of atomic weapons,
real estabfishment of international control, and real reduction
of armaments and armed forces.
That is why in the speeches of Mr. Jessup, not to mention
the speeches of Messrs. Lloyd and Moch, it is impossibIe to find
- and w c do not find any striving to reconcile the stand of
the United States, Great Britain and France on the given question with the staad of the Soviet Union. They stubbornly resist
this rapprochement, which is of course quite natural, since the
Soviet Union insists not on verbal assurances of readiness to
carry out these important decisions that are really capable af
elimkting the tension in international relations and of ensuring the peace and security of the peoples, but insists on
these decisions themselves, decisions such as the unconditional
prohibition of atomic weapons, establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
But these Powers cannot at the same time merely reject the
Soviet proposals, the Soviet amendments. They have to lend
a semblance of propriety to their stand on this question. They
have to cover up their stand with florid verbiage, M i n d which
they try to conceal the real substance of the matter.
Worthy of attention in this connection is the report carried
recently in the American press to the effect that Richard Bissell, Assistant Chief of the Mutual Security Agency of the United States, urged that the foreign policy of rhe United States
be formulated anew in such a way as to show-pmisely to show
and only to show-that the pxogram of European mmmnent
is a secondary matter compared with the broader aim of improving
the social and economic position of the W e t E w countries.
BisseU referred to the fact that the prestige of America had

-

91

dropped alarmingly in the estimation of the world public during tbe past year because the people, according to BisseU, bad
begun to arrive a t the conclusion that the United States stands
solely for armaments and that all assertions that the United
States allegedly seeks some end other than the armaments drive
and the increase of armed forces have been blasted.
There can be no doubt &at: the introducrion at the Sixth Session, right here at our Sixth Session of the General Assembly,
of the draft resolution of the "Three"on the reduction af armaments and armed forces pusues a simijar aim - to submerge
the real reduction of armaments and armed forces and the r e d
prohibition of atomic weapons in talk about the prohibition of
atomic weapons, and to reduce the entire matter mertfy to the
collecting of information on armed forces md imamen& and,
as previously, to concentrate on the armaments drive, on
thwarting any reduction of armaments and the prohibition of
atomic weapons.
We all make no secret of the fact that it is precisely from this
standpoint that we consider both the original draft of the resolution of the "Three" and the altered draft of this resolution.
Notwithstanding certain editorial changes, the content of the
draft resolution of the United States, Great Britain and France
in the revised version remains exactly the same as that of their
formcr draft. One can easily become convinced of this by carefully examinihg the revised draft of the abwe resolution. If
this revised draft does contain some new elements, it must be
said that this by no means improves matters. This should first
of a1I be said abut the second paragraph of the p d k of
the revised draft resolution of the "Three" which refers to the
so-called effective system of collective security.
Needless to say, the striving for effective coIlective security
in itself, to which, as is known, special articles of the United
Nations Charter, namely Artides 5 1 and $2, are devoted, cannot, of course, arouse any objection if the Charter is rally adhered to and if this formula is applied in conformity with the
principles, aims and tasks of the United Nations, We know,
however, that the formula for an effective system of collective
92
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security was already used, not d y aot in conformitp with the
United Nations Charter, but in direct violation of the Charter,
wbea the rmlution of Nwember 3,1950, imposed by the Atiantic
-ping
of United Nations members, appmed measures that
had nothing in common with the principles cnuaciated in tbe
CllarteK,

The events af last year have shown with stilI greater clarity
that the program of so-called collective measures envisaged in
Resolution No. 377
of which we shall speak in more detail
later when dealing directly with this question in reality is a
dangerow program, a program, I will say outright - of war, althoug: carnoaged by phrases h u t d t y , p h t w about peace.
The program outlined in the report of the s w d e d Collective
Mmures Committee is bound up with tbe conthudon of the
armaments drive, mobilization of manpower and material resources for the further prosecution of the war in the Fat East
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undereea by the Atlantic bloc, with the preparation fox other
war ventures and, comisequently, has nothing ia common with
the task now confronting the United Nations the task of reducing armaments and umed fozces.
It is Imown that the references to collective rnmres, to "effective" so-calledmwures of "defense" and similar aims which
camouflage the bellicose schemes and plans of their sponsors
are extensively used precisely for the further spreading of war
psychosis, the further expansion and intensification of war
measures.
The incorporation of this formula in the dteted draft resolution of the "Three" is incompatible with the aims which the
United Nations Charter sets before them when it spealrs of effective collective measures fox the prevention and removal of a
threat to peace and the suppression of acts of aggression and
the peevention ofother violations of peace or, as it is stated in
Artidc 5 1 of the Charter, for the exercise of the inherent right
of individual or colhive self-defense and of maintenance of international peace and sxurity.
The second paragraph of the preambk of the dtered draft
resolution, speaking of this effective system of so-called collec-

-

tive measures, undoubtedly has in view the so-ded system of
callective senuitg h d y reflected in the Remlution of the
Generoll Assembly adopted at the Fifth Session. The delegation
ofthe USSR objected to this resolution; a number of other delegations objected to it because dl these "collective measures" are
in reality directed not at defending peace, as shown for example by the war in Korea, but at facilitating the impIementation
of the aggressive plans of the Atlantic bloc, which tries to phy
a leading part in decidisg matters of war and peace in the
United Nations.
If we turn to Paragraph 3 of the preamble of the revised
draft resolution of the "Three" which replaced Paragraph 2 of
the original draft, the entire difference consists in that the
phrase about "levels adequate for defense but not for aggression" has been omitted here, if we do not count ane more difference: this is that the words " h e necessary means to this
end," which were in the original draft at [he end of this paragraph, have now been transferred to the beginning of this
paragraph.
Mr. Jessupexplained that the phrase about the level of armed
forces and armaments was deleted because of the doubts h u t
this formulation voiced by the representatives of the USSR and
other delegates, and he presented this as some kind of an essentid change.
Although the revised draft resolution of the "Three" no
longer contains references to the "level" or to the "criterion"
of the general limits and restrictions of all armed forces and
armaments, this, however, by no means signihes that the spanwrs of the draft have really decided to abandon their stand on

this matter.
Such a supposition would be completely gmundless, and this
is clearly seen from Point 6-A of the revised draft resolution
which reproduces the idea expreswd in Paragraph 3 of the preamble and in Point 5-B of the original draft.
Ind& Point 6-A instrum the commission to defme the m y
in which the general limits and reduction of all armed forces
a d all armaments can be calculated and established. However,
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chis of course obligates the commission to determine the very
the v q same criterion of which the original &aft spoke, Thus, the matter mmim in the very same
form as in the ariginrl.
I n its time the delegation af the USSR proposed to substitute
another point for Point 5 of the original draft. The same holds
tiue also for the present Point 6 of the revised draft, which we
propose to replace with mothex point, namely to instruct the
Atom~cEnergy and Conventional Armaments Commission to
prepare, within three months, practical proposals for the apphcation of said decision for aubrnission to the Security Council,
having in view the decision of the General Assembly on the
same level, determine

,

given question.
We consider it inexpedient to give the cornmissbn the narrow assignment contained in Point 6 of the revised draft resolution which, moreover, is again reduced to defining the "level"
and "criteria," which is exceedingly inexpedient, as shown by
the experience of the f xuitless discussion of such questions.
W e consider more expedient and more practicable the proposal of the head ~f the Syrian delegation who spoke of the
need to give the commission freedom of action md not to vest
it with restricted powers which could hamper it in finding ways
for wiving the problems confronting it.
The proposal of the Soviet delegation is heading in this direction, and this seems correct to us. This Qpeesk ~ e prospects
r
to the commission in its future work.

* * *

important question is
Anneot
members of the

a one-third reduction by the ptmaSecurity Council
the United States,
Great Britain, France, China and the USSR-of the armaments
and armed forces in their possession at the moment oE the adoption of the given resolution in the course of one year, counted
from the date of the adoption of this resclution.
M.Moch tried to joke here on this score -he'himself being
the one who enjoyed it most
by relating anecdotes about a
man who has one suit of clothes and who is asked to cut this
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suit by one-third. The representative of France, however, would
do k ~ e not
r to joke about such matters decting the situation
in certain countries where, with the policy they are pursuing
now, many people wdl soon be without wen one suit of dothes.
(Laivgktev. )
The point spoken of in the amendments of the Soviet Union
proposes that the General Assembly shodd "urge the govern*
ments of dl states, both members of the United Nations and
those not members of the United Natiom at present, to submit
immediateIy to the international control agency, and in any
case not later than within one month after the General Assembly &pts decisions on the prohibition of atomic w e a p and
the reduction of mmmcnts and armed forces, compIete information regaxding h e state Of their armed forces and all types
of armaments, including information on atomic weapons, at the
time of the adoption of the said decisions."
I see no need to speak again at length in favor of these two
provisions which I have just outlined.
I pointed out that the objections to this proposal, i.e., our
propod for the one-third reduction by the Great Powers of all
armaments and armed form, are based on-the utterly false assertions that the adoption of such a proposal would preeme for
the Soviet Union its alIeged military superiority. We also
pointed out that the objections to the proposal of the Soviet
Union, moreover, are based on the false theory of the so-called
"balance of power."
W e cited arguments and presented historic facts refuting
both this theory and the stand of those who are again trying to
revive this theory and to apply it to present conditions, asserting that precisely the "bahnce of power" among the Great
Powers can be a guarantee of international peace and security.
Unforhnately we have heard nothing in reply to this criticism, except the unconvincing arguments of the Bolivian delegate on this sybjtct,
The Bolivian delegate considered it necessary to present objections to our arguments, but the Bolivian delegate had to admit that after hearing from the Soviet deIegation about the
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Washington qreement of 1921-1922 and taking an interest in
this question -which we, of course, can only welcorn+he began to study this agreement and arrived at the coaclusion that
this agreement was aimed at ensuring peace in the Fat East by
establishing a Mance of armed forces ammg the United States,
Gr-eat Britain and Japan, but that in 1934 militaristic Japan d c
nouncd this agreement, became an aggessor and udeashed the
war in the Far East.
But I spoke of the very same thing, What then did the Bolivian delegate change or add to what X had said, except that he
revealed the secret of his "erudition" in this matter?
But having said what he did, he unfortunately did not draw
the proper condwion from it. EvidentIy he was hampered by
the lack of time and by his haste in studying this question. Yet,
by carefully weighing the facts which he learned from his apparently kpbimrd md cucsoy examination of the given +on
;,it would not have been difficult for the Bolivian delegate to
draw this conclusion on the given question. And this codusion
auld only be: the Washington agreement did not prwent Jspanese
aggression, and the so-called " b a b e of pnwer" collapsed under
the weight of the contradictions which tbm split the Powers that
concluded the Washingroa agrecmmt, contradictions which wnh u e ta operate in the camp of the capitalist powers even at
the present time.
Peru's delegate, toa, made a mistake in statiag that the Soviet
Union, while seeking prohibition of atomic weapons, at the
same time strives to preserve for itself freedam of action witb
regard to other types of weapons of no less destructive effect.
I must remind the representative of Peru, as well as the representative of Lthnon who expressed the same idea, if 1 am
not mistaken, that as far back as 1948, in the additiond proposals to the Soviet draft plan for the work of the Conventional
Armaments Commission, the USSR submitted a propod pointing to the need for full prohibition of production and use not
only of atomic weapons. but a h of atbet types of weapons designed for mass destruction.
Thus, the quation of the need to remove and prbhibit not
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only atomic wmpons but aIso a11 other types of weapons of
mass destruction of people, raised by them after s delay of three
years, had already been put forth by the Soviet delegation in
1948. Since then there has not been the slightest hint on the
part of the Soviet Union that it hm changed its stand on this
question. Such a fatmulation of the question fully conforms to
the stand and the general policy of the Soviet Union which it
has d o p e d from the time this qwstim first am%.
This, for instance, finds expression, and will fmd expression
also in the fact that I can now declare that we f d l y support the
amendment proposed yesterday by the Egyptian delegation,
which not only mentions the nncondltional prohibition of the
use of atomic weapons but &a speaks of aIl other tp.pes of
weapons of mass destruction.
W e support this fully and entirely, Mr. Delegate of Peru,
and you can be perfectly at ease on t b t score.
If you really want all other weapons of mass destructioa prohibited dong with the prohibition of atomic weapons, then
Tote t o d ~ yfor the prohibition of atomic weapons. But you will
not vote for this. And you referred here to the principal types
of weapons of mass destruction in addition to atomic weapons
only in order to cover up the fact that you will vote for the
resolution which does not contain even a hint of the prohibition of atomic weapons, to cover up your rejection of this prohibition by artificial, hazy, indefinite, vague and ambiguous
~hraseson this score.
And you say that our position is not clear, that there is something we want to conceal, that we want to utilize something in
our own interests when we demand that anahgous types of
weapons in possession of other states be withdrawn from na*
tional armaments. You are wrong. You are mtirely wrong. You
are following too serviIe$ the road which you ought not to

follow.
The delegate of Peru atsa made a mistake in the interpretation of. the concept "unconditional" prohibition of atomic
weapons.
I even find it strange and amusing to speak of it. I know that

I

do not like it when I say that I am amused. But d j "it
is no sin to laugh at what is really funny." W e say "uncondi' tional prohibition of the atomic weapon." And you teU us that
we make "unconditiond" dependent on control! We have
never done anything of the End.
You are entirely mistaken in your undersbnding of the expression "unconditioaal prohibition." I must explaii that unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, as we understand it,
is not at aU dependent upon control, upon its organization, its
forms, upon the methods of performing the functions of control, and so on. No,whw the Soviet Uaion dtmaads unconditional probibition of atomic weapons it means that the prohibition of atomic weapons must not be made dependent upon
my conditions, sucb as "stages" advanced in the Ekucb plan or
upon any other conditions capable of nullifying or even restricting to any degree the operation of the prohibition of
understand it, and therefore it is we who
really insist on the uncondittonal prohibition of atomic weap-

We have always argued that control cannot automaticaIly
bring about the prohibition of atomic weapons. Control can
only fulfill the funaim of control, h a t is, the functions of
verifying the observance of this probibition. And if there is no
prohibition, then there is no purpose in control -whether prohibition is declared unconditionally or conditionaIly.
It seems to me that after more than five years af debating
this question, it is time to understand each other's position. The
delegate of Peru bas probably still not gained proper understanding of this question.
The delegate of Peru referred to mathematical paradoxes. In
this too he made a mi&,
because it is far better to d d with
md use logical arguments and not mathematical. paradoxes. A
paradox always remains a padox, md it is a pradwr for the
very reason that it has no right to claim, to be the truth. But logic
always iemaim logic, is., it differs from paradox in that it has
the right to d i m to be the truth, for what is logid is real, and,
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vice versa, what is contrary to logic cannot be recognized as real
or true.
How far Peru's delegate artuaIly is from the realm of truth,
from the r& of reality, is obvious from his absolutely unsubstantiated and biased remark deging that the poIicy of the
Soviet Union has led to the disappearance of trust in the world.
With d the reservations of a well-bred person, be neverthekss
said such a thing. Is it possible that he whu said this r e d y be- 4
limes what he said klirves that trust has disappeared in intemationd relations h u s e of the Soviet. Union? DOp u dlp tbink so? I doubt it, because only persons who wear blinders
and who m o t see what is going on around them because of 11
these blinders can think so.
For a11 the facts before us, around us, facing us d of them
prove that it is by no means the Soviet Union's fault that trust
has disappeared from international relations. 1 shall not, of
course, enumerate h e x facts, Mr. President, not because Mr.
jessup may lose his self-control and demand a cessation of the
exposition of these fa&, as he did yesterday during the speech
of my colleague, the Byelorussian delegate, but because we have
spoken of this many times here, and 1do not want to take undue advantage of the First Committee's time and patience. I
shall merely say that in such a case the deIegate of Peru adheres
to the view
in speaking of the facts that if the statement
is contrary to the facts, then too bad fot the facts.
I could draw a certain prailel here between the speech of the
delegate of Peru and that of the delegate of France. The dclepa of France dm tried to make insinuations against us, although he knows very well that if he does, be will be exposed
at once. Digressions such as M.Moch permitted himself here,
hinting at some 15 countries which have aUegedIp lost their independence through the fault of the Soviet Union
digrcssions of this kind are a form of military cunning, springing
from the consciousness of the absolute inabiIity to defend r
position which cannot honestly be defended, and from the desire to divert attention from the question under discussion even
at the cost of methods impermissible in decent society.
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As for the substance of the question we are discussing, M.
Mwh preferred to repeat here the phrase that the Soviet Union
is trying, he says, to preserve its superiority in armed form and
to eliminate the superiority of the United States, Great Britain,
and France where, according to Moch, it exists. He again spoke
of the size of the Soviet Union's armed forces. of the number
of divisions and aircraft, which he' allegedly L o w s with rurprising exactness, and he deliberately understated the corresponding data concerning the armed forces of the United States
and its allies.
Need we return to this question? And if we do need to return, then is it not enough to suggest that M. Moch and those
who are prepared to follow him in this matter at least take
pains to read the minutes of the Special Subcommittee of the
Appropriations Committee of the United States House of Representatives for l95l? These minutes give data on the armed
forces of the United States, Great Britain, Fxance, Itdy, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherhds, Norway, Portugal and wen
Luxembourg. According to this data, the total number of armed
forces of these countries is almost 3,500,000. This data, wen
compared with the mythical data used here by M. Mocb and
others in talking about the armed forces of the Soviet Union,
is sdcient to a p s e the entire groundlessness of the whole
stand and the argumentation of M. Moch and others in this
matter.

Nevertheless M. M O C ~fallowing Mr. J ~ ~ J Ucontinuer
~ ,
to
repeat arguments which, in face of such fa*, are utterly senseless. He depicts the matter incorrectly, representing our proposal for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction
of armaments and armed forces as a unilateral demand designed to deprive the United States of atomic superiority and to
preserve our own superiority in all ather respects.
This is wrong. This is wrong, if only because the prohibition
of atomic weapons shouId extend to all countries possessing
atomic weapons, and, therefore, all such countries should be
deprived of the superiority which the possession of atomic
weapons gives them. .

As for conventional armaments, here too the one-third d u c tion of armaments sod armed forces by the five Great Pwers
in the course of one year wiIl give no advantage to the Soviet
Union. This is quite obvious from the way the ma&r stands
with regard to the present state of armaments and armed forces,
of which we have already spoken, and particdarly from the
absolutely indisputable h c t that the purpose of the Soviet Union's armed forces is to protect its frontiers and not to carry out
any aggressive pIans, which are alien to the Soviet State and to
Soviet foreign policy.
Even Mr. Acheson admitted that it was aaturd for a frge
-try
with a large popuIation and with a very long frontier
to have a hrge army a h . A hrge army of a p e f u l state
cannot k a threat to any state, even to a state with a smaller
army or even with a very s d and weak army. On the contraq, a smaU but aggressive sMte pursuing an aggressive pohcy
and cherishing plans to dominate neighboring countries and
even &e idea to dominate the world is a real menace to world
peace as, for instance, was the Ease with old Prussia which was
by no means a large state but was an aggressive state, a warlike
state, and was, therefore, always a threat to peace, even though
it had a comparatively Small m y .
This is caPlfirmed by numerous facts from the history of the
nations, and these facts ought not to be forgottenI just as the
lessons of b k h y ought not to be ignored. Certain delegam,
however, ure not indined to remember the facts of history, but
are indind, on the contrary, to dose their eyes to these facts
and wen more, to contemporary fscts. This refers, in parti&,
to those who tried here to dispute the fact tbat the responsibility
for inrematimat tension lia with the Atfantic btm cauntries
headed by the Unked Stats of America. But is it n d a fact
that this tension is caused by the frantic armaments chive, by the
organization of new military bssa and the -ion
of the
already existing bases in foreign countries? I shall remind yau,
for instance, that lodrry, at the present moment, the United States
is organizing five new air bases and, it seems, atomic bases in
Morocco. In m y c a s ~atomic weapons have now h e n adopted
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as a
of the amammts of the entire American Amy. h
this aot cause an hcmw in t u ~ ~ i m
nervousness,
,
k;
docs it
not woke anxiety, shake h e semity a d d d e n r e in security
of the vartious nations? Do mt the unl-g
of military actions
in the Far East, the throwing togetha of new military blocs and
the open preparation for a new world wartestified to by the
numerous facts from the activities primarily of the United States
of Ameria-plieate
and cause tension in international relations?

But who is implementing all the measures mumerated M e ?
Who is conducting this frantic armamenb drive? Who is buiiding new miiitary bases and expanding the old ones in the various
parts of the woxld, with the chief aim of encircling the Soviet
Union and the People's Democracies whh a belt of these bases?
W
y it is the United Stam, having set aa example of
this mmmenb drive in its own country €00, which must bear
tbe responsibility fox reammmt, i.s, for the armaments drive,
now taking place in certain countries of Westem Europe. To Ire
convinced of ,f thsiti b s&cient to see what took place in Rwne
at the Athtic bloc council a d what is now paking place generally
in the camp of the Atlantic bloc.
Let us take France for example. A few days ago the newspaper
Le Monde wrote that the American Government was continuing
to bring p m w e to bear on the F
d Government in order
to get it to exceed the "Preach budgetav possibilities," as Lg
Monde wrote, established in October 1950, is.,to get the budget
increased still more, md this in spite of the fad that the Frmch
Mhhtq of Defwlse bas set the expditures, as is Imm, at
610 bilIion in 1951, 725 biIlion in 1952 and 752 biIIim In 1953,
not counting IndmChina, the overseas territdties and the v n d ihrm m the so.calM NATO (North AtIantic Treaty Organization).
Naturally the French Government, as the same Lw N o d e
reports, must ask Harrman for an increase in Americas aid to
make up for tbe deficit which, according to L.P Monde, "may
endanger the French armaments pmgmm beprrd repair."
But a similar situation has also acisen at p i a p t with regard

I
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to Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and West Germmy? where all
measures regarding so-called rearmament, or, more tmre&y s+
ing, the armaments drive, are determined by the poky and
direction of aggressive circles in the United States.
Porter, Presideat Truman's acting Special Rep-tative
ia
the Economic Cooperation Administration in Europe, xecentfy
declared, at the beginning of December this p r , that Europe's
main task now is rearmament and not rehabilitation. Mormer,
he warn& that "the burden of rearmament will be heavy," but
that "the European workers and farmers must bear this Grden."
Who then, we ask, is the moving spirit of wcaIled m m a m a t , of, more c o ~ d yspealung the frantic armaments drive
being whipped up by aggressive k f e s in the United States,
which is already causing their friends in Europe and other pazis
of the world to svit their seams?
This is n que;tion worth tbinking about befare coming out
with mky arguments in defense of tbe American pIicy of an
armaments drive, before making decisions in tbis dtection in
support of this poliq of an armamente drive.
It m o t Ix denied that these are precisely the activities of
the aggressive cirdes of the United stat& of America which also
determine its corresponding foreign pkj.
Therefore, we haw the right to amrt thaf the raponsibility
for the present world tension rests precisely with t h a aggmsive
circles of the United States, Great Bfitain and France which hmd
the agqrmive Atlantic bloc.
Every day brings a stronger and more dehnite exposure of
the nonsensical stories of an alleged threat from the Soviet Union.
It is time it was understood once and for dl that the Soviet
Union has never threatened anyone and dm not threaten anyone.
And this has been proved by all of the more thau 30 prs'
histoiy of the Soviet State, which has been advancing steadfastly
dong the path of strengthening peace and international cooperation and ensuring the security of nations. On the otha
h d , every day brings new faas proving that the threat to
peace and the security of nations comes from the aggressive
Arlantic bIoc. It is this which explains the specific nature of the
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drafts of various resolutions s u b m i d for the consideration of
by the leaders of the A h t i c b k . Such
is the mhm also of the revised draft resolution of the "Three"
which, as we bave already shown during the discussion of a
number of its basic points, d m not soIve a single problem related
to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments
and, even less, to the prohibition of atomic weapons and the
establishment of strict intemationa1 control. Yet in this matter
there must kx complete Jasity. Guided by precisely such considerations, the delegation of the Soviet Union proposed to
fnclude in the draft molution of the "Three," as the first item
of the operative part, a point proposing that the GeneraI Assembly
declare the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapom and the
establishment of strict international control to ensure the observance of this prohibition. In this point the delegation of the USSR
proposes that the Genera1 Assembly instruct the Atomic Energy
and Conventional Armaments Commission to draw up and submit for the consideration of the Security Council a draft convention providing for measures to ensure the impiementation of
the G e n d Assembly's deGisions relating to the prohibition of
atomic weapons, cessation of their production, use solely for
civilian purposes of the atomic bombs already produced and the
establishment of strict international control over the irnplementatioo
the said idconention.
Can there be my comparison between these unequivocal, clearcut, resolute and dehite proposaIs of the Soviet Union and the
hazy, indefinite proposals, ammpanied by all kinds of resemtiom and conditions, mntaiqed in Point 3 of the draft resolution of the "Three"? It is high time to realize clearIy the
profound difference in principle between these two resolutions.
On one side, on the side of the Soviet Union, there is a proposal
to declare the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and
the estabfishment of strict international control, to draw up a
convention in the shortest time pssible providing for measures
to ensure the implementation of this prohibition. This is what
w e have on one side, on the side of the Soviet Union.
On the other side, on the side of the United States, Great
the General AssembIy
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Britain and France, thew. is neither a declaration of the pmhibition of the atomic weapon nor a decision to establish international control. There are, howwer, quite a few b a q phrases
which add up to instructing the Atomic Energy and Conventional
Armaments Commission ro draw up propmls on the reduction
of dl armed f o ~ c eand
~ on the establishment of effective control
for inclusion in the draft treaty, again with the objective of
ensuring the o b s m c e of the prohibition of atomic weapons.
But where is this probibition, the observance of wbich is to
be controlled? You gay: This is *If-evident. But hen permit
us to ask you to state this dearly and exactly: to prohibit atomic
w~aP0n.r.
But the t h e G w e r m e n ~ h eUnited Skates. Great Britain
and France-da not venture to a&rm the prohibition of atomic
weapons in dear rind precise terms. ~ h e evade
k
this question.
They mtrict themselves merely to instructing the commission to
draw up proposals of some sort-and not on the prohibition of
atomic weapons at that, but merely on the establishment of

control which aims at prohibiting atomic weapons,
One might think that there is some joke here, so lacking in
seriousness is this entire point, if m e has is view the red desire
to solve the problem which is contained in these exceptiody
important words : probibition of atomic w e a p s , establishment
of control to ensure the observance of tbis prohibition-a few
short but m c e p t i d y important words for which millions of
p p l e are now struggling, millions of people who will win
victory in this struggle despite el1 the subterfuges, tricks and
resistance they encounter on this path. These they will inwita . surmount, and they wiIl indubitably surmount them victoriously.
The delegation of the Soviet Union a h proposed to inciude
in the draft resolution d the "Three" its new point on the
&abLisbmmt of the international control agency withim the
framework of the Security Council. W e painted out that the
eslablisbment of such an agency should be provided for in every
sincere plan for a substantid reduction of a11 armed force and
armaments. The new Point 3 p r o p e d by the delegation of the

1

USSR, placed under No. 5 in the ttxt of our amendments, points
out that the tmk of this a g m q should be "mntroi of the reduction of all types of a ~ ~ ~ ~ and
e narmed
t s forces, as well as control to ensure that the decision to prohibit atomic weapons is
strictly

d scrupulously obseed and tbat this international

agency will have to obtain information on d armed forces, including semi-military, security and police forces, as well as a i l m a merits, including atomic wapns," and it also envisages effective
international inspeaion to be carried out in accorclance with the
d e d s i of
~ the aforesaid international control agency and fot this

control to include the wrihcation of the submitted information.
Is it possible to s p k more dearly df the real aim, tasks and
functions defmiig the rights and dutb of rhis control a m
tban our amendment does?
Sa that there will be no tack of clarity whatever regarding the
establishment of the international control agenq, the deleption
of the USSR proposed that the frrture convention sball provide
that the international control agencp be entrusted with control
over the prohibition of atwnic weapons, that it envisage the
composition, rights and dutid of this agency and alsa h t it
instruct this agency to carry out inspection, i.e., verifitation d
all the tmdertakings for the production and storing of atomic
weapons, immediakIy after the conclusion of the aforesaid convention in order to ascertain whether the convwtion on the
prohibition of atomic weapons has been implemented or not.
The sponsors of the draft resolution keep silent about our
pmpael far immediate i n s H o n and immedirtc verXcation
after the mnclusion of this convention, irrespective of whether
this internationd controI machinerg is funcrioning or notimmediate verifiation of the pioduction and storing of atomic
weapons. They prefer to evade this questim. Yet this proposal
is of great importance. It proves that the Soviet Union does not
propose and does not intend to postpone the control of the
prohibition of 'atomic w a p m until some later or very last
stage, as provided for in tbe Baruch p h , and as a d v d bp
the representatives of the United Ststes, Great Britain and France.
I must mention another matter. The memorandum of the
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Subrommittee's chairman, Mr. Padilla Nervo, points out, among
other things, an page 9 of the Rmm text, that these three
Powers consider that the establishment of an international con-

trol agency is implied in their draft.
But why only implied? Why do the Governments of the
United States, Great Britain and Frmce only imply the establishment of such M agency while they foam at the mouth, arguing
that precisely such an agency i the real key to the settlement of
the mitire problem of banning atomic weapons?
And does the Subcommim chairman's memorandum itself1
nPt state that only the draft amendments af the Soviet Union,
contain direct reference to the need for establishing an international control agency ?
Yet in the Subcommittee, by the way, certain of the t h e e !
Powers very stubrnly insisted that this phrase should not be!
iaduded in Mr. Nerw's memorandwn. We hsd to .exert no!
IittIe effort to show that ttre truth is the truth and that the!
memorandum a h d d d e c t the tmtb. I asked then to be shown
the point in the draft, resolution of the 'Three" which speaks
of the atPbkrhmnt of an inkmrtirml mntd agency. But h
could not be shown, beam it is non-existent.
Is this not a characteristic cirmmstance?
The representatives of the United States, Great Britain and
France are ready to imply many things. They imply the tskablishment of an inkmatima1 control agency, they imply the prohibition of atomic weapcm-hey are ready to imply-they wiLI
not be found wanting in this matter. But instead of implying,
it is necessary to make a direct statement, and this is exactly wbat
they avoid doing.
They sap-we do not vouch for ourselves. If the Assembly
makes the decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons and
here is no club over IS, such us international control, then we do
not vouch for ourselves.
But we do vouch for ourselves that even withml a club we wiIl
carry out this decision.
Accept this decision !
Mr.Jessup says: "Point 4 is a new point. It contains the samc
1
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idea as the Soviet amctldment No. 5 and, like tbek revised
Paragraph B of Point 3, makes dea~what was dearly e x p d
in the originaf tripartite draft, namely that an international control agency must be set up to ensure the carrying out of the
disarmament plan."
But now if we turn to revised point 3-B, it says nothing about
the estabIisbmmt of a control agency. This is said i h d i d y d y
in the phrase d d n g with i n s F i o n which should be carried
out in conformity with the decisions, as this point states, of "an
internatid control a g e q that is to l
x atablished."
But I say that you are playing with words. Here there is
reference to "an international control yenq that is to k establi~hed,"But by the same token it m y be said that everything&
to be established. having in view that it can be established. TO
say that inswim will be carried out in conformity with the
decisions of the "control agency tbd is to be e~trlbIi~hed"
by
no means signifies the decision to &ablisb sucb an agency. And
if it does signify this, then why not clarify it, why not eliminate
uncIarity, ambiguity? Why, in such u csue, not say precisely and
dtfinitcIy; be cot01roI agency is being estdblisked.
You, however, will not find a proposal to establish such an
agenq anywhere, either in Point 3, of which I have spoken here,
M in any other pIace, or in this vtty new Point 4 of the revised
draft remlution. This Point 4, really a new point, sap tbat the
commission is instructed to formulate "plans for tbe establishment of an international control agency within the framework
of the Security Councif." This is what is said here: to formu1at.e
phns far the &abIishment of an intanatimf control agency
within tbe framework of the Security Council. It is important to
note, however, that this point again does not speak of the
~ h b ~ h m e onft an intemationd control agency itself. k c quently, here we have the same circumvention of the question
instead of a precise and definite statement on this sare.
From aI1 that has just been said, the folIowing conclusion is
self-mident: the Gwernmenrs of the United States, Great Britain
and France, rejecting the proposal for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, or, to be more exact, the proposal
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that me h e r d Assembly declare an unconditional ban on
atomic weapons, avoid a direct commitment to establish a r ~
international control agency, resorting to camouflage on this
question with the help of tangled, nebulms phases. The new
Point 3 propod by the delegatim of the Soviet Union and Point
3-B in the revised draft resoIution of the 'Three" differ not d y
in wording, not only in forrnuIation - there is a tremendous
difference in substance between them. This difference also
determines our disagreements.
If the authors of the draft resolution of the "Three" really want
the convention to include a reference to the establishment of an
international control agency, there is nothing to prevent them
from doing so. And this must be done. But they do not do tbis.
Tbis is, howwer, done by us, the delegalion of the Soviet Union,
and herein l i i the advantage of our proposal.
On December 15 Mr. Jessup, it seems, spoke three times. In
his third speech on December 25, Mr. Jessup displayed no little
playfdnts and exerted no little effort in an attempt to cheer up
the First Committee, telling it about the golden chariot drawn by
60 white dwes, the magic wand and Cinderella. Apparently Mr.

Jessup has mixed things up, imagining perhaps that he is no longer
in the Politid Committee but among children dancing in a ring
around a Christmas Tree. ( h g b m , ) Christmas is appmhing.
But this would not be so dangerous for the First Committee. Mr.
Jessup, however, did not succeed in adopting a serious tone after
his witticism even when he turned to the analysis of serious questions discussed in the First Committee.
Really, can one take seriously Mr. Jessup's remark that since the
third amendment of the Soviet delegation on the unconditional
prohibition of atomic weapons and the preparation of a convention envisaging measures that m u t e the implementation of this
convention consists of two paragraphs, the first of which speaks
of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of
control, whik the second contains an instruction to the commission to prepare a draft of a corresponding convention, lhis mpaos,
as he said, that there is only a remote connection between
these two questions, even the hidden aim to wade the esthIish110
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ment of international control after probibition of atomic weapons
is decked.
Mr. Jessup reproached the Swiet Union for not having shown
AexibiIity by objecting to the Baruch plan for five years. But what
flexibility did the United States of Amerim show in insisting upon
this plan for five years, declaring that it is the very best &Ian and
that there is none better -even if it did make the reservation that
if a M e r plan appws they will think about it ? But they know in
advance that no better plan will appear because they consider it
the best of all possible plans. Yet they insist, they continue persistently to adhere to the pasition of this Baruch plan in spite of a11
fully substantiated and serious criticism to which it has been justly
subjected from various sides. I gave fa&. Even such a publication
as the British newspaper Times says that the Baruch pIan is a
utopian plan. Therefore, it is senseless to defend this plan,
unless the aim is to have no pIan at all.
Here is the stand of the ~n{ed States, Great Britain and France.
They ray: '*Butyou too insist on having your wag - no Baruch
plan; accept our plan." Then I& us examine the reasons for our
not wanting your plan. Because it hums a so-called international
control sgenq into an American supertrust, subordinates to it and
turns over to it the whole economy of the country whose entire
fate will thus be determined arbitrarily by decisions of this international control agency which, even $ tbk words of the advocates
of Ulis plan, must inwitably be an agency which will implement
the policy of the United States d America. This plan threatens the
-reign
rights of nations and states. Therefore, it cannot be
agreed to by those who value the sovereipty of their country and
heir people. The Baruch plan is unacceptable precisely because it
threatens the sovereign rights of nations and states. It is also unacceptable because it is fruitless, for it postpones the most important thing to the last stages, again making it dependent upon a
number of conditions which, in their turn, we entirely. dependent
on wur discretion.
if mention is made of stages, of ownership whch, under the
Baruch plan, the control agency has of aU atomic raw materials
and all atomic undertakings, even those allied to the atomic in+

dusty, it wiil become dear t ? d of course this plan cannot be accepted by t h e states which do not want to commit suicide.
-MI.
J & U ~ said, as before, that the Soviet Union proposes prohibition of tbe atomic weapon m paper. But we have already
pointed to the fallacy and groundlessness of this objection. This
was also pointed wt by the Egyptian delegate in his s p d of
December 15, whose words on this score I do not think it superfluous to repeat before the members of the committee today.
The Egyptian delegate said:
"It is practically im@ble to establish an organization for a n tmI over the production of atomic weapons and for the utilization of all atomic energy for civilian purposes, which dso means
control, without this requiring much time. What are we to do
meanwhile?" the Egyptian delegate asked. "Could we not draw
s line h e e n the production of atomic weapans, control over
these weapons and atomic energy, and the actual use of these
wapons? We have," k said, "a certain number of conventions,
sud; ss the Red Cross convention, thc convention banning the use
of poison gas and many others whih pursue humane a&. They
envisage no other control and no other sanction but moral sanction. Perhaps you rernemhr," the Egyptian delegate said. "that
at the hginning of the last World War the United Kingdom,
France and Germany pIedged themselves not to use poison gas.
There was a convention prohibiting the utiIiEation of poison gas,
and atthough this convention has not yet beea ratified by a&" the
Egyptian delegate said, and f will add on my own behalf that it
has not yet been ratified for some mysteriaus reason by the United
States of America although more &in 40 years have bassed since
then - I continue quoting the Egyptian delegate - "the piedge
not to use poison gms was strictly observed by bhe three Powers
and by the other countrjes, despite the fact that Europe was faced
with so-mlled total war for the first time.
"Why can we not find," the Egyptian delegate said, "on the
same basis, some means of prohibiting the use of atomic weapons,
at feast of those already existing, inasmuch as full control over the
production and utilization of atomic energy for civilian purposes
will be a proIonged and tiring pmess?"

Thus spoke a representative of r d l country, and it bas already been refommended here that the voice of small countries be
listmed to, and our delegation fully supports md has always supported these recommendations. Even more, their voices should be
respected. Even moie, t k e countria should be respected.
This is the bbest k i t of whether the aspirations are peaceld or
aggressive. And tbP should be remembered by the gentlemen sitting on my right, as weU. Particdariy' by them, and not only in
connection with Egypt, Mr.Lloyd.
1 do not intend to delve into the question of bow much time
wilI really be requtrd for establishing a system of interriatima1
controi and for -g
into motion the entire machinery of the
international contra1 agency.
If, indeed, the establishment and setting into motion of the machine~of i n t e m t i d control over the prohibition of atomic
weapons will be, as is a s s d by the Egyptian delegate and as is
also spdically assumed by the representatives of the United
State who spoke here about the -1
of this period, a d l y
p i o h & process, it is all the more necessary to recognue that
the prohibition of atomic weapons must not be made dependent
upon the completion of this process of orgaaizatioa of control, because if it is such a prolonged process, this will be oaly an additional argument in favor of the impermissibility of tying up the
prohibition of atomic weapons with control, with its organization.
Tbis is an additional argument in favor of our stand, in favor of
t h stand not only of the Soviet Union, but of certain other delegations which have already expressed this view both in their
speeches and in their draft resolutions.
If the organization and the setting into motion of he machinery
of international control over the prohibition of atomic weapons
is dragged out for many months and perhaps wen years, and the
prohibition d atomic weapons is linked with tbis control and
its going into operation, this would be utterly impermissible, bcause in this way the very prohibition of atomic weaponsI of their
production and their use, would reaIly be postponed (8d kdendcfs
Gr4ecu
for an &definitely long period, a d mankind would al-
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ways be in danger of the precipitation of an at.tomic war at any
minute. W e are not afraid of it, if we are to s p k of h Soviet
Union, .as we have never been afraid of those who ty to a t k k us
or who have attacked us. W e have never feared them ! But we are
a country of peace and for this reason we want to prevwt the
danger of war which threatens mankind surd portends perhaps the
greatest of calamities.
As for the delegation of the Soviet Union, while defending its
proposal that the General 'Assembly declare an unconditional ban
on atomic weapons, it also upholds the necessity of taking all
measures to reduce to a minimum the period for establishing international contml. And we cven established the date one and a balf
months ago
Februav 1, 1952 - for preparing a cormponding convention. Wc are told that this date is unrealistic.
Gentlemen, are you seriously concerned over the impraaicability
of this date? Let us discuss the date if you accept our proposal at
least in principle. Accept it, and then we will mch an agreement
on the date. The matter of the date wiil not be an obstade. It
would be ridiculous if we subordinated the decision of such an
important question as the prohibition of atomic weapons to the
question of the date.
But when you say an "unrealistic date" you tbink that you
have discovered an Achilles* heel, and that you can down Achilles
himself by striking at it. You ate, hawever, greatly mistaken. We
are realists, and for this reason we say: Let us reach an agreement
on the prohibition of atomic weapons.
Here we have the General AssembIy declaring: Prohibit atomic
weapons! But you say: " W e do not vouch for o u d v e s because
there is eo control over us and we do not know whthez we will
pass this test*"
But we vouch for ourselves that we shall pass the test wen if
t h e is no control. In order to check up on this, the well-known
British proverb should be foIlowed: "The proof of the pudding
is in the eating," otherwise p wiil never know how it tastes. But
you do not vouch for yourseIves. This, of course, may give &e to
serious apprehensions on the part of those who intend to be your
pattners, because everyone always presumes that everyone vouches
X 14
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for himself if he undertakes some obligation. But you do not
vouch. To a certain extent you may be right in your own way, because many xesolutio~have already been adopted which you do
not fulfill. Many intematiod agreements have been c~lcluded
with you which you do not fdGU.Is it worth while to enumerate
aI1 thm resolutions which yoa adopted but have not fulfilled ?
Incidentally, Mr. jessup bas enumerated bere those draft reso.

lutiom which were submitted by the Soviet Union md dedined,
as well a the resolutions which were adopted against the will of
the Soviet Union and against its vote and have not been fWed
by the Saviet Union. But he forgot one category of resolutions,
those for which the United States as well as Great Britain and
France voted, and which have not been fulfitled by them.
It will not be amiss to r e d again in this connection that the
utopian Baruch plan, as it is called, provides a convenient m a s
for drowning the actual organization of international control and
enforcement of the prohibition of atomic weapons in talk about
intematiod conhl.
Now, as follows from Mr.Jessup's recent statement, he does not
seem to dare to deny the m o d , p i t i c a l and even legal fom of
the General Assembly's decisions, of which we spoke Iast time.
But he nevertheless continues to object to our proposal that the
General Assembly declare the unconditional ban on atomic weapons and the establishment of international control, claiming t b t
it will be impossible to adopt such a props1 before a control
mechrism is set set up and put into operation.
Being aware of the weakness of his p i t i o n , Jessup stated that
he could agree to the general idea of the moral, political and legal
force of the General Assembly's derisions.
As I have already said, Mr. Jessup referred to certain earlier
resolutions of the General Assembly which indeed have neither
moral, political nor legal force for the Soviet Union, atthough,
according to Jessup, they are important decisions on the question
of peace'and international security.
But it is precisely this last circumstance that we question first of
slI. W e voted against these decisions precisely because we doubted
their usefulniss to the cause of peace and intematiod security.
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In other cases we did not and do not iecognk the legality of these
decisions, for instance the legality of the ignominious resolution on
ppodaiming the Rople's Republic of China an aggressor, on using
the United Nations in the armed American and Syngman U e e intervention in Korea and a number of other resolutions. We openly
objmed to them. We opedy voted against them, and it would be
absurd to demand that we fulfill these decisions. Indeed, we are
here to settIe international affairs and not internal state affairs.
But ia international affairs a state cannot be compelled to do someLbing to which it objects. But. the General Assembly is comp a d of s~vaeignstates, aftbough some of them do not follow their awn paths and cannot always even express their own
opinions, since they are under very strong pressure, exerted on
them for purpes contradicting the principles md provisions of
the Chatter . . . Mr.Jessup mafuses facts here. Had we voted for
sonic res~tutionand then violated it, it would be right to rebuke us
accordingly.
But the d state of affairs is just the opposite. I shall s p k
h u t the Wrd category of the General Assembly's resoIutions,
over which Mr. Jessup passed in siIence, those for which the
United State voted and which the United States docs not fulfill.
Take, for example, the resolution of January 24, 1Y46, on the
study of problems that had arisen in connection with the discovery
of atomic energy. Has it bsen fuIfrlled by the United States? It has
not! Here is another resolution dated December 14, 1946, establishmg the general regulation and r e d d o n of armaments and
armed forces. Has it been f & i l l 4 by the United States ? It has not !
Here you have the resolution of November 3. 1947, on masum
which must be taken against the instigators of mather war. This
resolution bas not been ful6lIed by the United States either. With
regard to the USSR, in our press, in statemmts - I do not mean
only okial, but even quite ordinarg statements - nowhere will
you h d d k for another war! And what h u t you?
I bave already s e e n about the frenzied, mad propaganda with
which your notorious magazine Coltier's has besmirched itself.
Just listen to your radio. Look & your press, at alI your s@cers the nro~ire~ponsibieortes, standing on the top of the state ladder
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and you will see and hear endless war calls. After that, we shall
discuss the question concerning the dIocatim 01I00,000,000d01Iars. Can there be mything more d i s g d l than that, t b p u r
act dated October 10, 1951?
A decision on the impermissibility of war propaganda bas been
adopted, but this propaganda is conducted in the United States
the broadest scale; it spreads, forming such a sea-, such an o m ,
that in comparison with it the AtIantic QMan is a mere puddle!
A decision on the extxadition and punishment of war criminals, a
decision on mutual relations between the United Nations me&=
and Spain, a decision on faIse and libeIws information - none

of these decisions is berng fulfiiied by the United S W . And what
a b u t the international agreements, ehe Ydta agreement, the Potsdam a g m e n t ? And you wilt assert that it is not you who have
split Gefmany into two parts, that it is not y w who have set up
the Bonn puppet government, that it is not pw who are dragging
Western Germany into the Atlantic blor:to use it as a springboard
for attack. An attack against whom?This is said openly - against
the Saviet Union, against the People's D e m d e s . Doa this accord with international agreements? Is this what is called res*
for international agreemenb ? Is this what is called resped for the
United Nations Charter? Does this correspnd to the decisions
which I have bridy e n u m e d bere, and does this &ow r e s p
for the decisions of the General AssembIy? It has become customary for you to violate both the decisions of the Gmerd Assembly
and international agieements which you at one time called gentlemen's agreemenb! There is the ignominious affair of thrusting
Greece into the Security Council. We have had, it seems to me, 17
rounds of voting because the United States sedcs the electh of
G e e at any cost, despite the k c e of any legal grounds for
this. You win probably achieve your aim because the iduence of
the d o h is unfortunately still great, as grat, in generd, as the
economic dependence of certain countries on the United States, dep e a b which still makes itself felt!
And yet in the face of such and similar facts, the repmmtatives of the Atlantic blac malre bold to lecture us concerning respect for the decisions of the GeneraI Assembly!
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In 1946 we concluded a gentlemen's agreement. W e are fulfilling it accuratefy. But it is pfdsely the Unitd Sbtes that is violating tbis agreement for a11 to see. And after this tbq dare to say
that they are not sure that the Soviet Union would fulfil1 the decisions it signed. Let these gentlemen name at Ieast one decision
wbich bars our signature and which we have violated at any time.
Let them show it to us. They will not be able to do this, while we
can present dozens of cases of such violations by the United States.

amendments, mostly unessenS tial dekptions havethesubmitted
draft resolution of the "Three." But
OME

amendments, to

there is one ammdmmt which the delegation of the USSR reg=&
as an important amendment worthy of serious attention: the
amendment of the Egyptian delegation of wbich I have already

spoken.
There is another amendment, in the form of a draft resolution,
submitted by the Palish delegation and proposing that a decision
be made to set up under the Security Council a commission on
atomic energy and conventio~larmaments after the di5salution
of the Atomic Energy Commission. It also recommends that the
Security Council dissolve the Commission on Convwtional Armaments. The Polish draft resolution suggests that the draft resolution of the "Three," as we11 as the amendments to that draft sub
mitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union, be referred to the
Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission.
The delegation of the Soviet Union thinks that this propwaI
is important and to the point. The experience of the Subcommittw's work h s shown that a careful and patient examination of
the question, particularly one of such exceptional importance as the
one now before our commit&, yields positive raults.
It is indeed impossible to deny that for the first time during this
period we have succeeded in rearbing agreement, though it h only
on secondary questions, and that, what is more important, despite
sharp differences in principle separating us from you-&
United
State, Great Britain and France-both sides displayed due tactfulnas, patience and t h o u g h t f h in considering various questions,
1x8

which, of come, cannot be disregarded when questions of primary
political importance are being settled.
That is why the delegation of the Soviet Union maintains that
the exaerience of the ~-&mmmittee's work has shown that thorough k d patient study of questions, particularly those of such
exceptional importance, gives positive results, as 1 have said.
Mr. Nervo, chairman of the Subcomdtke, pints out that despite the wisting differences - unfortUfI8tely large and serious
differences
in the proposais of the Soviet Udoa znd of 'the
tbree Powers on a number of questions of primarg importance, a
certain degree of agreement bas been reached in the Subcommitlee
on a number of aspects of both programs, and the discussion
of t h e ~- eauestions in the S u h n m i ~ mhas h e l d to braaden the
range of agreement on' certain questions, even if they are of a
secondaty riabe.
This gives wery reason to support the proposal of the delegation of the Polish Republic which, as we understand it, proceeds
from the m i b i i of further fruitful effort in the search for a
generally breed sojution to the question of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, reduction of armaments and armed
forces and the establishment of an internationd control agency to
enforce the observance of the decisions adopted on this score.
Tbe delegation of the USSR has dways striven for agreed decisions. It is striving for thiS now too, d d e n t tbat such agreed
decisions can be reached in the Committee of Twelve, provided
here is good will, mutual respect and genuine striving for the
consolidation of internatiod mopration, peace and the security
of nations.
Therefore, we fully support the proposal submitted by the ddegation of the Polish Republic.
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Ail qnolrpliot~sin t b i ~speech brwe been rebraided from #be
&$siron.

